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 “The Big Chill”: Personal Liability  
and the Targeting of Financial Sector 
Compliance Officers 
COURT E. GOLUMBIC* 
Financial sector compliance officers have been referred to by prominent law enforcement 
and regulatory officials as “essential partners” in ensuring compliance with relevant laws 
and regulations. Yet a series of recent enforcement actions in which individual compliance 
officers have been sanctioned personally have placed strains on the partnership, fueling 
concern among these professionals that they are being unfairly targeted. 
 
Law enforcement and regulatory officials have responded with assurances that the 
partnership remains intact. In the rare instances in which financial sector compliance 
officers have been held personally responsible for program failures, they have stressed, the 
actions were undertaken only after careful consideration, where the facts demonstrated that 
the compliance officers “crossed a clear line.” 
 
Efforts to justify regulators’ charging practices have been ineffective, however, for the 
perception of targeting has endured. Indeed, it has coincided with increased attrition within 
the ranks of senior compliance officers in the industry. The Author offers several possible 
explanations for this “chilling effect.”  
 
Regardless of the cause, regulators are confronted with a fundamental policy question: 
whether the benefits of current charging practices justify the continued exodus of senior 
compliance professional from their firms or the industry entirely. The Author advances two 
proposals to reverse the perception of compliance officer targeting and its attendant chilling 
effect, including the adoption in the United States of a supervisory structure akin to the 
United Kingdom’s “Senior Managers Regime”  
 
These proposals reflect a clear message. Actions must be taken to reverse the perception of 
compliance officer targeting before the “big chill” sets in, and the industry finds that this 
critical function has been robbed of its best and brightest. 
 
 *  Court E. Golumbic is a Participating Managing Director and the global head of Financial Crime 
Compliance for the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”). He is also a former Assistant United States 
Attorney with the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, and a former Senior 
Adviser to the Under Secretary for Enforcement at the United States Treasury Department. He is currently an 
adjunct professor at the New York University School of Law and has formerly been an adjunct professor at the 
University of Pennsylvania School of Law.  The Author would like to thank Professor Stephanos Bibas, Professor 
Geoffrey Miller, Jennifer Lund, and Frank Ungerer for their assistance in writing this Article. The views 
expressed herein are those of the Author and do not necessarily reflect those of Goldman Sachs. 
GOLUMBIC_17 (MEDRANO) 12/22/17  12:40 AM 
46 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:45 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 47 
I.  RECENT CASES CHARGING INDIVIDUAL COMPLIANCE OFFICERS  
WITH “WHOLESALE” OR “BROAD-BASED” PROGRAM FAILURES 51 
A. THE BSA CASES ............................................................... 52 
1.   FINRA V. BROWN BROTHERS HARRIMAN & CO.  
AND HAROLD CRAWFORD ........................................... 53 
2.   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY V. THOMAS 
HAIDER ...................................................................... 57 
3.   FINRA V. AEGIS CAPITAL, CHARLES SMULEVITZ,  
AND KEVIN MCKENNA ............................................... 60 
4.   FINRA V. RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES  
AND LINDA BUSBY ...................................................... 62 
B. THE ADVISERS ACT CASES ................................................ 64 
1.   In the Matter of SFX Financial Advisory 
Management Enterprises, LLC and Eugene 
S. Mason ................................................................... 66 
2.   In the Matter of BlackRock Advisers and 
Bartholomew Battista ............................................. 68 
II.  THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS   
AGAINST FINANCIAL SECTOR COMPLIANCE OFFICERS .............. 70 
A. THE REGULATORS’ INITIAL RESPONSE ............................. 71 
B. SEC COMMISSIONER GALLAGHER’S DISSENT  
IN SFX AND BLACKROCK .................................................. 73 
C. THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO GALLAGHER’S DISSENTS ........... 74 
D. FINRA’S POST-GALLAGHER DISSENT STATEMENTS ......... 78 
E. THE RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF COMPLIANCE  
OFFICER TARGETING ....................................................... 80 
III.  THE ENDURING PERCEPTION OF TARGETING AND ITS “CHILLING 
EFFECT” ON FINANCIAL SECTOR COMPLIANCE OFFICERS ......... 81 
A. THE CHILLING EFFECT ..................................................... 81 
B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE ENDURING 
PERCEPTIONS  OF TARGETING ......................................... 82 
1.   The Aggregate Impact of Recent Enforcement 
Actions ..................................................................... 83 
2.   The “Isolation Factor” ............................................ 83 
3.   Recent Trends in Law Enforcement and Regulatory 
Policy ........................................................................ 85 
IV.  PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING THE PERCEPTION OF TARGETING   
AND ITS “CHILLING EFFECT” ................................................... 87 
A. SENIOR MANAGER ACCOUNTABILITY ............................... 88 
GOLUMBIC_17 (MEDRANO) 12/22/17  12:40 AM 
December 2017]                  THE BIG CHILL: PERSONAL LIABILITY  47 
B. JOINT INDUSTRY-REGULATORY ADVISORY GROUP .......... 90 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 92 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Prominent law enforcement and regulatory officials have referred to 
financial sector compliance officers, whose “difficult job[s]” merit 
“appreciat[ion] and respect,”1 as “essential partners”2 in ensuring 
compliance with relevant laws and regulations. Officials have noted the 
critical role compliance officers can and do play in shaping the culture of 
financial institutions, as well as the industry more generally.3 However, 
a series of recent enforcement actions in which financial sector 
compliance officers have been personally sanctioned4 have strained the 
 
 1. See Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Address at the 
2015 National Society of Compliance Professionals, National Conference (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/keynote-address-2015-national-society-compliance-prof-cereseney.html; 
(“[Compliance officers] have a challenging and difficult job . . . . The Commission and its staff hold 
compliance professionals in high regard . . . . We thank you for your diligence and commend and 
support your work.”); see also Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement, 
The Role of Chief Compliance Officers Must Be Supported (June 29, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/supporting-role-of-chief-compliance-officers.html; (“[Chief 
Compliance Officers] take their jobs seriously and are a credit to the compliance community.”); Preet 
Bharara, U.S. Attorney for S. Dist. of N.Y., SIFMA’s Compliance and Legal Society Annual Seminar 
Prepared Remarks of U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/ 
usao-sdny/speech/sifma-s-compliance-and-legal-society-annual-seminar-prepared-remarks-us-
attorney [hereinafter Bharara SIFMA Remarks] (“Over the years, I have come to appreciate and 
respect more and more the work that you all do, as compliance and legal professionals in the securities 
and finance industry. You do not have an easy job.”); Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Remarks at National Society of Compliance Professionals National Membership Meeting (Oct. 22, 
2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch102213mjw; (“[Compliance officers] have a very 
tough job in a complex industry where the stakes for all concerned are extremely high. We recognize 
that and have tremendous respect for the work you do.”). 
 2. See Ceresney, supra note 1 (“[Compliance officers] have the Commission’s full support. We 
rely on you as essential partners in ensuring compliance with the federal securities laws and we will 
do all we can to help you perform your work.”); see also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Sues Thomas E. Haider, Former Chief Compliance 
Officer of MoneyGram International, Inc., for Violating the Bank Secrecy Act (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-sues-thomas-e-haider-former-chief-
compliance-officer-moneygram [hereinafter DOJ Haider Press Release] (“Compliance officers 
perform an essential function in our society, serving as the first line of defense in the fight against 
fraud and money laundering.”) (quoting Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y.). 
 3. See, e.g., Bharara SIFMA Remarks, supra note 1 (“It gives me confidence that together we can 
usher in a new age of institutional accountability and responsibility. And that together, we can ensure 
that our companies set a global standard for operating ethically and with integrity.”). 
4. See Letter from Raymond James & Assoc., Inc., et al., to Dep’t of Enf’t, Fin. Indus. Regulatory 
Auth., Financial Industry Regulatory Authority Letter of Acceptance, Waiver & Consent No. 
2014043592001 (May 18, 2016); see also U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-1518 (D. Minn. 
Jan. 8, 2016) (order denying motion to dismiss); Dep’t of Enf’t v. Aegis Capital Corp., No. 
2011026386001 (Aug. 3, 2015) (order accepting order of settlement); In the Matter of SFX Fin. 
Advisory Mgmt. Enterprises, Inc., SEC; Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4116, Administrative 
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partnership between such officers and law enforcement and regulatory 
officials, fueling concerns that these professionals are being unfairly 
targeted.5 
Law enforcement and regulatory officials have responded to these 
concerns with assurances that both the ethos of a partnership and their 
even-handed enforcement approach remain intact.6 Officials have 
stressed that in the rare instances in which financial sector compliance 
officers have been held personally accountable, the majority had engaged 
in affirmative misconduct.7 Rarer still, the officials contend, are cases 
where compliance officers were found to have exhibited “wholesale” or 
“broad-based” failures in carrying out responsibilities assigned to them.8 
 
Proceeding No. 3-16591 (June 15, 2015); In the Matter of Blackrock Advisors, LLC, SEC; Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 4065, Investment Company Act Release No. 31558, Administrative 
Proceeding No. 3-16501 (Apr. 20, 2015); Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., Letter of Acceptance, Waiver 
and Consent No. 2013035821401 (Feb. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Brown Brothers Consent]; see also infra 
notes 15, 24, 35–79, 82–116, 130–167, 176–183, 268 and accompanying text. 
 5. See, e.g., Emily Glazer, The Most Thankless Job on Wall Street Gets a New Worry, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 4:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/now-in-regulators-cross-hairs-bank-
compliance-officers-1454495400; Dawn Causey, Who Should Have Personal Liability for Compliance 
Failures?, A.B.A. BANKING J. (Aug. 17, 2015), http://bankingjournal.aba.com/2015/08/ 
who-should-have-personal-liability-for-compliance-failures/; Ben DiPietro, SEC Action Stirs 
Concerns Over Compliance Officer Liability, WALL. ST. J.: RISK & COMPLIANCE JOURNAL (June 24, 
2015, 1:08 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/06/24/sec-actions-stir-concerns-
over-compliance-officer-liability/; Rachel Louise Ensign, How Compliance Officers Can Limit 
Personal Liability, WALL ST. J.: RISK AND COMPLIANCE JOURNAL (Jan. 30, 2015, 1:43 PM), https://blogs. 
wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/01/30/how-compliance-officers-can-limit-personal-liability/; Matt Kelly, 
Compliance Officer Liability, Part I: How Much to Panic in General, COMPLIANCEX (Jan. 27, 2016), 
http://compliancex.com/compliance-officer-liability-part-i-how-much-to-panic-in-general; DLA 
PIPER, DLA PIPER’S 2016 COMPLIANCE AND RISK REPORT: CCO’S UNDER SCRUTINY 3 (2016), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/Files/Insights/Publications/2016/04/DLA_Piper_Compliance
_Risk_Survey_Report2016.pdf; see also infra notes 169–170, 196–197, 210, 252, 267–271, 275–276, 
279, 312 and accompanying text. 
 6. See Ceresney, supra note 1 (“I am hopeful that, after you hear my remarks, you will 
understand that [recent SEC actions against compliance officers] . . . are consistent with the 
partnership we have developed to foster compliance with the laws.”); see also Mary Jo White, Chair, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Compliance Outreach Program for Broker-Dealers 
(July 15, 2015) (“To be clear, it is not our intention to use our enforcement program to target 
compliance professionals.”); DOJ Haider Press Release, supra note 2 (“In my job, I’ve met hundreds 
of compliance officers and I know them to be some of the most dedicated and trustworthy 
professionals in the financial industry. FinCEN and our law enforcement partners greatly depend on 
their judgment and their diligence in our common fight against money laundering, fraud, and terrorist 
finance.”) (quoting Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, U.S. Treasury Dep’t); see 
also infra notes 198, 211–225, 288 and accompanying text. 
 7. See Ceresney, supra note 1 (explaining that in the vast majority of cases the SEC brings against 
CCOs the compliance officers “are affirmatively involved in misconduct that is unrelated to their 
compliance function” or have engaged “in efforts to obstruct or mislead.”); Aguilar, supra note 1 
(noting that the “vast majority” of cases the SEC brought against compliance officers involved officers 
“who ‘wore more than one hat,’ and many of their activities went outside the traditional work of 
[compliance officers] . . . .”); see also infra notes 8, 9, 198, 202, 211–223, 225, 264, 288 and 
accompanying text. 
 8. See Ceresney, supra note 1 (“The third category of cases where we have charged CCOs are where 
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In these particular cases, officials have stressed that the enforcement 
actions proceed only when, after carefully weighing the evidence, the 
facts indicate that the compliance officers “crossed a clear line.”9 
Efforts to allay compliance officers’ fears and justify regulators’ 
charging practices appear to have been ineffective, however, for the 
perception of targeting endures. In fact, the perception has coincided 
with increased attrition within the ranks of senior compliance officers in 
the industry.10 In February 2016, for example, The Wall Street Journal 
reported that the number of senior bank compliance executives who had 
left their jobs in 2015 was three times greater than in 2014.11 Evidence 
also suggests that the specter of personal liability is causing potential 
leaders in financial sector compliance to reconsider their career paths.12 
In a recent survey of Chief Compliance Officers (“CCOs”) of public 
companies, sixty percent said they would think more carefully about 
future roles they might consider given the risk of personal liability.13 
Regulators are thus confronted with a fundamental policy question: 
whether the benefits of current charging practices, such as the potential 
for increased vigilance, justify the continued exodus of senior compliance 
professionals from the industry. 
This Article examines the emerging focus on personal liability for 
financial sector compliance officers and the potential “chilling effect” 
attendant thereto. Part I begins by reviewing the most noteworthy recent 
enforcement actions in which compliance officers have been held 
personally accountable for program failures at their firms, and the 
 
the CCO has exhibited a wholesale failure to carry out his or her responsibilities. . . . This category is 
considerably smaller . . . but has drawn significantly more attention.”); see also Press Release, Fin. Indus. 
Regulatory Auth., FINRA Fines Raymond James $17 Million for Systemic  
Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Failures: Former AML Compliance Officer Fined and Suspended 
(May 18, 2016), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2016/finra-fines-raymond-james-17-million-
systemic-anti-money-laundering-compliance (“[W]hen there are broad-based failures within specific 
areas of responsibility, we will seek individual liability where appropriate.”) (quoting Brad Bennett, Exec. 
Vice President & Chief of Enf’t, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth.) (emphasis added); see also infra notes 9, 
198, 202, 211–223, 225, 264, 288 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Ceresney, supra note 1 (“[W]e in Enforcement and the Commission take the question of 
whether to charge a CCO very seriously and consider it carefully. We think very hard about when to 
bring these cases. When we do, it is because the facts demonstrate that the CCO’s conduct crossed a 
clear line.”); see also Jennifer Shasky Calvery, Dir., Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Conference (Jan. 30, 
2014), https://www.fincen.gov/news/speeches/remarks-jennifer-shasky-calvery-director-financial-
crimes-enforcement-network-8 (“I think if you look at our past enforcement actions, and review the 
facts, you can see clearly why FinCEN took action in these cases.”); see also infra, notes 198, 202,  
211–223, 225, 264, 288 and accompanying text. 
 10. See Glazer, supra note 5; DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5. 
 11. See Glazer, supra note 5. 
 12. See DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5; see also infra notes 169–170, 196–197, 252, 267, 
 275–276 and accompanying text. 
 13. See DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 9. 
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statutory bases for these actions.14 The cases fall into two categories: (1) 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”) and U.S. Treasury 
Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) 
actions for alleged violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”); and (2) 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) actions for alleged 
violations of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).15 
Part II explores the impact of these and related enforcement actions, 
including the perception among compliance officers that they are being 
unfairly targeted.16 This Part also delineates the efforts undertaken by 
senior SEC, Treasury and FINRA officials to combat this perception 
through public statements defending their charging practices generally, 
as well as the evidentiary records in the noteworthy cases discussed in 
Part II.17 Based on regulators’ public statements, it is possible to ascertain 
an overarching rationale supporting the regulators’ approach to holding 
compliance officers responsible for failures involving their firms’ 
programs.18 
 
 14. See infra Part II. 
 15. Id. FinCEN, FINRA and the SEC have brought a number of enforcement actions against 
individual compliance officers in recent years alleging a variety of regulatory violations. Some have 
involved charges against compliance officers who served in other senior managerial roles. See, e.g., In 
re Sunrise Sec. Corp., Letter of Acceptance, Waiver & Consent No. 2013036840901 (Dec. 9, 2015). 
Some have involved compliance officers who were charged along with other firm personnel. See, e.g., 
In re John Carris Investments, Inc., Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011028647101 (Jan. 20, 2015). This 
paper focuses on the cases that have garnered the most press attention, and therefore have been most 
influential in contributing to the emerging perception of compliance officer targeting. See Raymond 
James & Assoc., Inc., supra note 4; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-1518 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 
2016); Aegis Capital Corp., supra note 4; In the Matter of SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enterprises, Inc., 
supra note 4; In the Matter of Blackrock Advisors, LLC, supra note 4; Brown Brothers Consent, supra 
note 4. For a more complete overview of SEC and FINRA enforcement actions against compliance 
officers generally, see Brian L. Rubin & Amy Xu, Make America Compliant Again: SEC and FINRA 
Enforcement Actions Against Compliance Officers During an Election Year (January–August 2016), 
EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (Jan.–Feb. 2017), http://www.sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/Articles/ 
195841/Make-America-Compliant-Again-SEC-and-FINRA-Enforcement-Actions-Against-Compliance-
Officers-During-an-Election-Year; Brian L. Rubin, Katherine E. Dumeer & Amy Xu, Harry Potter and 
the Compliance Stone: SEC and FINRA Actions Against Compliance Officers (July–December 2015), 
EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND (May-June 2016), http://www.sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/ 
Articles/189138/Harry-Potter-and-the-Compliance-Stone-SEC-and-FINRA-Enforcement-Actions-
Against-Compliance-Officers; Brian L. Rubin & Irene A. Firippis, Shaken Not Stirred: SEC and FINRA 
Disciplinary Actions Against Compliance Officers (January–June 2015), EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND 
(Nov.–Dec. 2015), http://www.sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/Articles/180877/Shaken-Not-
Stirred-SEC-and-FINRA-Disciplinary-Actions-Against-Compliance-Officers; Brian L. Rubin & Irene 
A. Firippis, Compliance Wars: SEC and FINRA Disciplinary Actions Against Chief Compliance 
Officers and In-House Counsel in a Galaxy Not Too Far Away (July–December 2014), EVERSHEDS 
SUTHERLAND (May-June 2015), http://www.sutherland.com/NewsCommentary/Articles/174146/ 
Compliance-Wars-SEC-and-FINRA-Disciplinary-Actions-against-Chief-Compliance-Officers-and-
In-House-Counsel-in-a-Galaxy-Not-Too-Far-Away. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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Part III examines the “chilling effect” that regulators’ actions are 
having on both current and would-be compliance officers. This section 
also offers several possible explanations as to why the targeting 
perception endures, despite the efforts of regulators to mollify 
compliance officers’ fears.19 These explanations include the aggregate 
impact of recent enforcement actions, the failure to charge other senior 
business and control-side personnel along with compliance officers, and 
the increased focus by law enforcement and regulators on individual 
accountability in the corporate context.20 
Part IV advances two proposals designed to mitigate the chilling 
effect of compliance officer liability. First, U.S. regulators should adopt a 
supervisory scheme similar to the “Senior Managers and Certification 
Regime” recently implemented by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority 
(“FCA”) and Prudential Conduct Authority (“PCA”). This regime, which 
assigns personal liability to designated “Senior Managers” in connection 
with defined standards of conduct, promotes the appropriate degree of 
accountability for both compliance officers and for a range of senior 
business and control-side personnel.21 Second, the industry should 
establish an advisory body composed of former industry and regulatory 
officials to develop guidelines on best practices in cases where the 
conduct of compliance officers is at issue.22 A group of this sort would 
promote greater uniformity and transparency in charging decisions, as 
well as a sense among compliance officers that their interests are fairly 
represented.23 
I.  RECENT CASES CHARGING INDIVIDUAL COMPLIANCE OFFICERS  
WITH “WHOLESALE” OR “BROAD-BASED” PROGRAM FAILURES 
The last several years have witnessed an increase in enforcement 
actions against individual compliance officers for alleged breakdowns in 
their financial institutions’ compliance programs.24 The most noteworthy 
of these actions, which have been pursued by various regulators, have 
alleged violations of either of the BSA or the Advisers Act. 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See infra notes 278-291 and accompanying text. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Greg Marshall & Erin Sullivan, Avoiding Personal Liability Amidst Heightened AML 
Enforcement, INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/03/03/ 
avoiding-personal-liability-amidst-heightened-aml (“Given the changes in the enhanced regulatory 
landscape . . . it is no surprise that more cases against individual compliance officers are now being 
brought.”). 
GOLUMBIC_17 (MEDRANO) 12/22/17  12:40 AM 
52 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:45 
A. THE BSA CASES 
The BSA and its implementing regulations require, among other 
things, that financial institutions: (1) implement an effective anti-money 
laundering (“AML”) program to prevent financial institutions from being 
used to facilitate money laundering or the financing of terrorist activities 
and (2) report suspicious transactions involving potentially unlawful 
activity.25 The BSA requires that all financial institutions establish an 
AML program that includes, at a minimum: (1) the development of 
internal policies, procedures and controls; (2) the designation of an AML 
compliance officer; (3) an ongoing employee training program; and (4) 
an independent audit function to test the program.26 
The most significant recent enforcement action charging a 
compliance officer with violating the BSA was brought by the FinCEN 
and FINRA.27 The case, U.S. Department of the Treasury v. Haider, 
involved allegations that MoneyGram International (“MoneyGram”) and 
its former CCO failed to implement and maintain an effective AML 
program and file timely suspicious activity reports (“SARs”).28 The BSA 
transaction reporting rule on which FinCEN’s case against MoneyGram 
and Haider was based requires money remitters to report financial 
transactions of at least $5,000 occurring by, at, or through the remitter.29 
MoneyGram and Haider were charged with violating the BSA’s 
general civil penalty provision, 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1), which allows 
FinCEN to assess civil penalties against a “partner, director, officer, or 
employee” of a financial institution for willful violations of the BSA, with 
the exception of two BSA sections.30 FinCEN has long interpreted 
“willfully” in the civil context to include conduct where a person acts with 
“reckless disregard or with willful blindness.”31 
 
 25. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(g), (h) (1982); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.19, 103.20, recodified at 31 C.F.R. 
§§ 1022.210, 1022.300, 1023.320 (2006). 
 26. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h)(1) (1982). Among the procedural requirements the BSA prescribes is that 
covered financial institutions have in place risk-based customer identification programs, customer due 
diligence and, in the case of certain higher-risk customers, and enhanced due diligence. See Uniting & 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept & Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 312, 326, 115 Stat. 272, 304–06, 317–18 (2001). 
 27. See Raymond James & Assoc., Inc., supra note 4; Aegis Capital Corp., supra note 4; Brown 
Brothers Consent, supra note 4. 
 28. The applicable BSA regulation required money remitters to report financial transactions that: 
(1) were sent by or through the remitter; (2) involved (individually or in the aggregate) funds of at least 
$5,000; and (3) the remitter knew, suspected, or had reason to suspect, among other things, the use 
of its money transfer system to facilitate criminal activity. 31 C.F.R. § 103.15(a)(2) (1972). Such SARs 
were required to be filed within thirty days of the remitter detecting facts that may have constituted a 
basis for filing the SARs. Id. 
 29. 31 C.F.R. § 103.15(a)(2) (1972). 
 30. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (1982). 
 31. In re B.A.K. Precious Metals, Inc., No. 2015-12, at 3 n.6 (Dec. 30, 2015) (“In civil enforcement 
of the Bank Secrecy Act under 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1), to establish that a financial institution or 
individual acted willfully, the government need only show that the financial institution or individual 
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The most noteworthy recent BSA enforcement actions brought by 
FINRA have involved three broker-dealers: Brown Brothers Harriman & 
Co. (“Brown Brothers”); Aegis Capital Corp. (“Aegis”); and Raymond 
James & Associates, Inc. and its affiliate Raymond James Financial 
Services, Inc. (collectively, “Raymond James”). The FINRA cases 
included charges that the broker-dealers’ AML compliance officers 
violated one or both of two FINRA rules: (1) Rule 3310(b), which requires 
member firms to establish and implement an AML program, including 
written procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the 
BSA; and (2) Rule 3310(a), which requires members to establish and 
implement procedures “that can be reasonably expected to detect and 
cause the reporting of transactions” required under the BSA and its 
implementing regulations.32 The primary BSA transaction reporting rule 
that on which FINRA predicated its cases against individual compliance 
officers is the requirement that broker-dealers report suspicious 
transaction activity involving at least $5,000 that are conducted by, at, 
or through the broker-dealer.33 
Unlike the recent FinCEN case against MoneyGram and its CCO, the 
FINRA cases against compliance officers of Brown Brothers, Aegis and 
Raymond James did not cite the general BSA penalty provision. Nor did 
the cases include any allegations that the compliance officers penalized 
acted willfully, recklessly, or with willful blindness. Rather, FINRA 
simply alleged facts with respect to specific program deficiencies without 
regard to the individual compliance officers’ states of mind. 
Detailed discussions of these recent BSA cases against compliance 
officers follow. 
1.   FINRA V. BROWN BROTHERS HARRIMAN & CO. AND HAROLD 
CRAWFORD 
One of the most highly publicized FINRA enforcement actions 
against an individual compliance officer for AML program failures came 
in February 2014. Brown Brothers and its global AML Compliance 
Officer, Harold Crawford, entered into a settlement with FINRA on 
charges that Brown Brothers and Crawford failed to maintain an AML 
program reasonably designed to detect and cause the reporting of 
suspicious activity.34 The charges stemmed from what FINRA deemed to 
 
acted with either reckless disregard or willful blindness.”). 
 32. See FINRA Rule § 3310(a), (b) (Jan. 1, 2010). The FINRA cases have also alleged violations of 
FINRA Conduct Rule 2010, a “catchall” provision which requires members, in the conduct of their 
business, to “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.” 
FINRA Rule § 2010 (Dec. 15, 2008). 
 33. 31 C.F.R § 103.19, recodified at 31 C.F.R. § 1023.320(a)(2) (2016). 
 34. See Brown Brothers Consent, supra note 4, at 2–5, 16. 
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be control failures relating to Brown Brothers’ transaction activity in low-
priced securities, otherwise known as “penny stocks.”35 
Specifically, FINRA alleged that Brown Brothers directly executed 
sales or, as custodian, delivered to other firms the securities underlying 
the sale of at least six billion shares of penny stocks, generating at least 
$850 million in proceeds.36 This included penny stock transactions 
conducted via the omnibus accounts of foreign banks, which enabled 
certain underlying customers in known bank secrecy havens such as 
Switzerland, Guernsey, and Jersey to transact without disclosing 
identifying information of their clients or information regarding the 
origin and beneficial ownership of the penny stock positions.37 
FINRA contended that federal law obligated Brown Brothers to 
investigate customer activity “on a risk basis,” and that omnibus accounts 
transacting in penny stocks merited additional scrutiny.38 In addition, 
Brown Brothers and Crawford were aware that the firm’s brokerage 
activity had expanded “when its Swiss clients ‘realized they could offer 
their underlying clients anonymous access to U.S. Securities [sic] 
markets.’”39 FINRA observed that while Brown Brothers had an AML 
program that included suspicious activity monitoring, the system “failed 
to adequately monitor and detect potentially suspicious penny stock 
activity, and sufficiently investigate potentially suspicious penny stock 
transactions that were raised to the Firm’s attention.”40 
FINRA further alleged that from January 1, 2009, to June 30, 2013, 
Brown Brothers executed transactions or delivered securities involving 
at least six billion shares of penny stocks, many on behalf of undisclosed 
customers of foreign banks in known bank secrecy havens.41 Brown 
Brothers executed these transactions despite the fact that it was unable 
to obtain information verifying that the stocks were free trading.42 In 
many instances, Brown Brothers lacked such basic information as the 
identity of the stock’s beneficial owner, the circumstances under which 
the stock was obtained, and the seller’s relationship to the issuer.43 
FINRA averred that Brown Brothers and Crawford were aware of the 
heightened risk associated with penny stock activity and the limited 
 
 35. Id. at 2. FINRA adopted the SEC’s definition of penny stocks, which includes securities that 
trade at less than $5 per share and are quoted over-the-counter. See Fast Answers: Penny Stock Rules, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 9, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers 
pennyhtm.html. 
 36. Brown Brothers Consent, supra note 4, at 2. 
 37. Id. at 3. 
 38. Id. at 2. 
 39. Id. at 3. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 2–3. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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ability to obtain beneficial ownership information from clients in bank 
secrecy havens.44 In light of these risks, Brown Brothers and Crawford 
“failed to have an adequate surveillance system to review penny stock 
transactions” conducted through the firm, and failed to tailor the firm’s 
AML procedures “to adequately detect, investigate and report suspicious 
activity,” particularly patterns or other red flags, relating to penny stock 
transactions.45 
FINRA noted that Crawford, as Brown Brothers’ global AML 
Compliance Officer, was responsible for ensuring that the firm’s AML 
program was adequately tailored to the risks of its business.46 In 
addition, Crawford “was personally, or through his designee, responsible 
for making determinations as to whether to file SARs on behalf of the 
[f]irm and was ultimately responsible for establishing and implementing 
a program reasonably expected to detect and cause the reporting of 
suspicious activity” in appropriate cases.47 FINRA ascribed to Crawford 
the following, specific program failures: (1) being aware of Brown 
Brothers’ increasing penny stock business and the risks associated 
therewith, but failing to persuade the business to adopt its 
recommendations to enhance controls;48 (2) permitting Brown Brothers’ 
business to conduct a manual review (rather than automated 
surveillance) of the firm’s execution trading activity to identify and 
escalate potentially suspicious activity for approximately two years, when 
this manual system could not adequately monitor given the volume of 
trading that was taking place;49 (3) implementing automated 
surveillance which, for approximately two and one-half years, was not 
adequately tailored to detect the volume of transactions going through 
Brown Brothers’ accounts;50 (4) failing to establish written procedures 
relating to surveillances and delaying reviewing reports for several 
 
 44. Id. at 5. FINRA noted that in May 2011, Crawford forwarded an email with a draft of an AML 
Compliance presentation that was to be the basis for a discussion with bank clients in Switzerland and 
for a presentation made to a firm committee in June 2011 relating to the firm’s involvement in penny 
stocks. Id. The draft presentation stated, “Brokerage is being offered as an ancillary service to [Brown 
Brothers’] Custody clients. The service expanded on the brokerage platform once Swiss banks realized 
they could offer their underlying clients anonymous access to U.S Securities markets. . . . Anonymity 
is ‘ensured’ throughout the life of the trade.” Id. at 5–6. 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. For example, in a memorandum to the business, the AML Compliance group, including 
Crawford, recommended that, among other things, Brown Brothers cease executing trades for penny 
stocks below a certain threshold value. Id. at 6. The group also recommended that Brown Brothers 
consider discontinuing the omnibus account structure in favor of a structure requiring the disclosure 
of the underlying clients on whose behalf penny stock transactions were being effected. Id. The firm 
did not follow these recommendations. Id. 
 49. Id. at 7. 
 50. Id. 
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months after automated surveillances were implemented;51  
(5) implementing one automated report to track significant increases in 
the share price of a security, but failing to implement procedures to 
review related surveillance alerts until approximately four months later; 
(6) improperly handling surveillance alerts;52 (7) inadequately 
investigating reports generated by a surveillance to identify trading that 
represents a significant portion of the daily volume;53 (8) failing to 
provide adequate guidance to AML compliance staff regarding the review 
and disposition of surveillance alerts;54 (9) failing to update and properly 
investigate information accumulated through the firm’s system on 
custody movements associated with entities previously known to be a 
concern;55 and (10) failing to file SARs in several instances where AML 
staff erroneously misinterpreted the relevant reporting standards or 
failed to update prior SAR filings when activity continued through the 
firm more than 90 days after the previous SAR was filed. 
Brown Brothers was censured and fined $8 million for these and 
other alleged program deficiencies,56 the largest penalty ever issued by 
 
 51. Id. FINRA observed that Brown Brothers implemented a low-priced equities (“LPE”) report 
in about December 2010, but failed to establish written procedures for instructing AML compliance 
staff about how to review the report until May 2011. Id. In another case, a “trading-ahead-of-market 
events” report was implemented in August 2011, but the firm failed to create written procedures 
regarding how alerts were to be addressed until December 2011. Id. at 8. 
 52. Id. FINRA noted several cases in which AML compliance staff did not address or review 
activity identified through the LPE report for several months after the surveillance was implemented. 
Id. at 7. For example, FINRA cited four reports, generated in January 2011, that identified firm 
customers selling a penny stock that was previously known to the firm as being the subject of 
regulatory requests and a web post accusing the CEO has having “ripped off” people. Id. While firm 
clients sold the security in January and February 2011, resulting in over $5 million in proceeds, AML 
compliance staff failed to review the report until April 2011. Id. In another example, a July 2012 
“trading-ahead-of-market events” alert was disposed of by an analyst with comments indicating that 
no derogatory news had been identified in the public domain regarding the issuer, and that no 
suspicious activity had been identified. Id. at 8. In fact, the penny stock in question had been the 
subject of previous alerts and several suspicious news articles touting the stock. Id. 
 53. Id. According to FINRA, Brown Brothers implemented a monitoring price manipulation trade 
alert module (“MPM”), designed to track high representation of firm clients in a stock’s daily trading 
volume, to its automated transaction review system in May 2012. Id. at 8. FINRA cited “at least one 
occasion” where the MPM surveillance failed to alert due to a failure in the surveillance logic. Id. 
FINRA also contended that certain MPM alerts were inadequately investigated. Id. at 9. For example, 
in November 2012 an MPM alert was disposed of without taking into account previous investigations 
relating to the security that was the subject of the alert or trading activity taking place earlier in the 
week involving the same client and security. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. FINRA noted that throughout the relevant period, Brown Brothers’ AML program 
monitored custody movements and associated settlement activity by, among other things, using alerts 
generated based on a keyword list established by the firm. Id. at 9. While words were added to the list 
from time to time, the firm failed to properly investigate information that continued to be accumulated 
on entities that had previously been identified as a concern. Id. 
 56. Brown Brothers was also charged with failure to: (1) adequately supervise activity in foreign 
financial institution accounts; (2) conduct adequate AML training and testing; and (3) establish, 
maintain and enforce a supervisory system to achieve compliance with Section 5 of the Securities Act 
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FINRA.57 Crawford was fined $25,000 personally, and was subject to a 
one-month suspension from association with any FINRA member.58 
2.   U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY V. THOMAS HAIDER 
The most significant BSA enforcement case against a compliance 
officer in his personal capacity was brought by FinCEN against Thomas 
Haider, the former CCO of MoneyGram.59 MoneyGram operates a money 
transfer service that enables its customers to transfer money to and from 
various locations in the United States and abroad through its global 
network of agents and outlets.60 MoneyGram outlets are independently 
owned entities that MoneyGram has authorized to transfer money 
through its money transfer system.61 MoneyGram agents are the 
individuals or entities that own and/or operate MoneyGram outlets.62 As 
a money transmitter, MoneyGram is subject to, and must comply with, 
various requirements set forth in the BSA and its implementing 
regulations, including the regulatory requirements to implement and 
maintain an effective AML program and file timely SARs.63 As 
 
of 1933. Id. at 12–16. 
 57. See Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Fines Brown Brothers Harriman a 
Record $8 Million for Substantial Anti-Money Laundering Compliance Failures, (Feb. 5, 2014), 
https://www.finra.org/newsroom/2014/finra-fines-brown-brothers-harriman-record-8-million-sub 
stantial-anti-money-laundering. 
 58. Id. In a more recent case, the SEC charged the former AML Compliance Officer of  
broker-dealer Windsor Street Capital (Windsor) with BSA violations. In re Windsor St. Capital, L.P. 
(f/k//a Meyers Associates, LP), Administrative Proceeding No. 3-17813 (Jan. 25, 2017). The SEC 
alleged that Windsor, formerly named Meyers Associates L.P. (Meyers), failed to file SARs relating to 
$24.8 million in suspicious transactions, including those occurring in accounts controlled by two 
microcap stock financiers who were separately charged the same day with conducting a pump-and-
dump scheme. Id. ¶¶ 19–25; see also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Raymond Barton, Case 2:17-cv-00403 
(Jan. 25, 2017). The violations attributed to Meyers and Telfer related to Meyers’ penny stock 
liquidation business, in which the firm routinely accepted physical deposits of large blocks of penny 
stock shares and allowed its customers to liquidate them, followed by the customers transferring out 
the sale proceeds. Windsor St. Capital, L.P., No. 3-17813 ¶ 20. The SEC alleged that the information 
submitted to Meyers in connection with such deposits put the firm and Telfer on notice of numerous 
red flags. Id. Moreover, certain red flags were brought directly to Telfer’s attention through 
notifications from Meyer Associates’ clearing firm. Id. Notwithstanding the presence of these red flags, 
Meyers and Telfer allegedly failed to undertake a reasonable investigation to determine whether a SAR 
filing would be necessary. Id. ¶ 21. The SEC further charged Meyers and Telfer with failing to 
investigate and file SARs on a series of additional penny stock transactions by eight unnamed 
customers despite the presence of red flags. Id. ¶¶ 25–38. Meyers was charged with repeatedly 
violating Rule 17a-8, which requires broker-dealers to comply with the BSA’s suspicious activity 
reporting rule, as well as the other BSA reporting, recordkeeping and record retention requirements. 
Id. ¶ 19. Telfer was specifically charged with “caus[ing]” and “aid[ing] and abett[ing]” those violations. 
Id. Filed as an administrative proceeding, the matter is currently pending. Id. at 1. 
 59. See Complaint, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, Civ. No. 14-9987 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2014). 
 60. Id. ¶ 1. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. ¶ 2. 
 63. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.15(a) (1972). 
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MoneyGram’s CCO, Haider was responsible for ensuring that the 
company complied with these obligations.64 FinCEN charged that Haider 
failed to ensure that MoneyGram met either obligation during his tenure 
as the company’s CCO.65 
The Federal Trade Commission alleged that between 2004 and 
2008, MoneyGram agents in the United States and Canada “aided 
fraudulent telemarketers and other perpetrators of telephone and 
internet scams who misled U.S. consumers into wiring tens of millions of 
dollars” to participants in fraudulent schemes.66 In connection with this 
misconduct, FinCEN ascribed to Haider’s AML program the following 
deficiencies: (1) rejecting or ignoring written disciplinary policies that 
required agents and outlets to be terminated for engaging in transaction 
activity deemed high risk for fraud;67 (2) failing to terminate agent outlets 
despite evidence that they were the subject of high numbers of internal 
fraud alerts and recommendations to terminate specific agents and 
outlets;68 (3) allowing sales personnel to resist proposed agent or outlet 
terminations;69 (4) failing to ensure that MoneyGram’s Fraud 
Department shared relevant information on instances of known fraud 
with the department responsible for filing SARs, contrary to guidance 
furnished by outside AML consultants;70 (5) failing to ensure that 
MoneyGram performed adequate audits of agents and outlets, including 
those whom MoneyGram personnel knew or suspected were involved in 
 
 64. Haider Complaint, supra note 59, ¶ 3. 
 65. Id. ¶ 4. 
 66. Id. ¶ 61. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 68–75. 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 76–93. Haider allegedly received regular spreadsheets identifying specific outlets that 
had accumulated “an alarmingly high number of Consumer Fraud Reports.” Id. ¶ 78. One such 
spreadsheet, which listed all of the Canadian outlets that had received at least one fraud-induced 
money transfer in 2006, revealed that the top ten outlets in terms of losses to consumers had received 
between 62 and 241 fraud-induced transfers in 2006 alone. Id. For those outlets, “an exceedingly high 
percentage of their total number of received money transfers . . . were reported as fraudulent.” Id. In 
addition, Haider allegedly received periodic recommendations from MoneyGram’s Fraud Department 
to terminate specific agents and outlets for fraud. Id. ¶ 79. On several occasions in 2007, for example, 
MoneyGram’s then-Director of AML Compliance assembled lists of outlets in Canada that the Fraud 
Department recommended for termination, along with information supporting the conclusion that 
these outlets were engaging in or ignoring fraud. Id. ¶¶ 79–80. Despite the recommendations, all but 
seven of the 49 outlets remained with MoneyGram during Haider’s tenure as CCO. Id. ¶ 86. 
 69. Id. ¶¶ 94–95. Haider allegedly “allowed the agent/outlet review process to function such that 
when the Fraud Department wanted to terminate an agent/outlet, it generally had to consult with the 
Sales Department before doing so.” Id. at ¶ 94. As a result of this structure, the consultation process 
resulted in instances where “efforts by the Fraud Department to terminate or otherwise discipline 
known high-risk agents were frustrated or delayed.” Id. 
 70. Id. ¶¶ 96–101. FinCEN alleged that Haider maintained MoneyGram’s AML program such that 
the analysts responsible for filing SARs were not provided with information from the Fraud 
Department, including information identifying specific outlets that had experienced high incidence of 
fraud. Id. ¶ 96. As a result, the Fraud Department failed to refer potentially reportable events to the 
SAR analysts. Id. 
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fraud or money laundering;71 (6) failing to ensure that MoneyGram 
conducted adequate due diligence on prospective agents, or existing 
agents seeking to open additional outlets;72 and (7) failing to ensure that 
MoneyGram filed timely SARs despite MoneyGram personnel having 
been put on notice that specific agents and outlets accumulated excessive 
numbers of internal fraud alerts and other red flags or had been proposed 
for termination.73 
FinCEN alleged that as a result of Haider’s failures, agents and 
outlets that MoneyGram personnel knew or suspected were involved in 
fraud and/or money laundering were allowed to continue to use 
MoneyGram’s money transfer system to facilitate their fraudulent 
schemes, thereby causing MoneyGram’s customers to suffer substantial 
losses.74 Haider was assessed a $1 million civil money penalty for willfully 
violating the BSA and its implementing regulations¾the largest penalty 
ever assessed against an individual compliance officer for BSA 
violations.75 A Department of Justice (“DOJ”) action to collect the fine 
also sought to enjoin Haider from participating, directly or indirectly, in 
 
 71. Id. ¶¶ 102–07. For example, FinCEN contended that as of December 2005, MoneyGram had 
not performed any compliance audits in Canada, despite the fact that the Fraud Department had 
suspected that numerous agents/outlets in Canada were participating in fraud. Id. at ¶ 103. Even after 
December 2005, MoneyGram did not perform risk-based audits of known high-risk agents and outlets 
in Canada. Id. Moreover, to the extent audits were performed, they were allegedly often ineffective, in 
that auditors were not trained to look for the warning signs of fraud or otherwise conducting thorough 
AML compliance reviews. Id. ¶¶ 105–08. FinCEN noted that “some MoneyGram agents/outlets that 
Haider failed to terminate were not subjected to audits precisely because the agents/outlets were 
understood to be engag[ed] in fraud.” Id. ¶ 107. 
 72. Id. ¶¶ 109–12. According to FinCEN, this resulted in, among other things, MoneyGram 
granting outlets to agents who had previously been terminated by other money transmission 
companies, and granting additional outlets to agents who MoneyGram personnel knew or suspected 
were involved in fraud and/or money laundering. Id. FinCEN alleged that under Haider, MoneyGram 
personnel allowed new agents to open outlets, and existing agents to open additional outlets, without 
taking steps to verify that a legitimate business did or could exist at the proposed outlet sites. Id. ¶ 110. 
In addition, in evaluating new agents MoneyGram did not inquire whether they had previously been 
terminated by another money transmission company, “notwithstanding that MoneyGram personnel 
recognized that prior terminations were an indicator of fraud.” Id. ¶ 111. In addition, during Haider’s 
tenure MoneyGram allowed an agent known to have operated outlets engaged in fraud or money 
laundering to expand his network of twelve outlets. Id. ¶ 112. 
 73. Id. ¶¶ 114–26. FinCEN cited instances in which MoneyGram outlets had been identified by 
the Fraud Department as having participated in so-called “flipping” schemes, whereby outlets in the 
U.S. received fraud-induced money transfers and then immediately sent the funds to another outlet in 
Canada. Id. ¶¶ 113–16. Despite these discoveries, MoneyGram failed to file SARs on the outlets due to 
the lack of information sharing between the Fraud Department and SAR analysts. Id. FinCEN cited 
other cases in which the Fraud Department identified outlets that had engaged in a high number of 
fraud payouts resulting in significant losses, and were the subject of hundreds of internal fraud reports. 
Id. ¶¶ 116–20. In these and many other cases, the agents and outlets involved had been recommended 
for termination. Id. ¶¶ 116–26. Yet, in none of these cases were SARs timely filed. Id. 
 74. Id. ¶ 5. 
 75. Id. ¶ 134; see also Former Compliance Officer Assessed Million Dollar Penalty for Company’s 
Role in Money Laundering Violations, WIGGIN & DANA (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.wiggin.com/ 
15639 (calling the penalty against Haider “unprecedented”). 
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the conduct of the affairs of any financial institution as defined in the BSA 
for a term of years sufficient to prevent future harm to the public.76 
Haider moved to dismiss the fine, arguing that the BSA applies to 
institutions, not individuals.77 The United States District Court for the 
District of Minnesota denied the motion, reasoning that the BSA’s civil 
money penalties provision applies to partners, directors, officers, and 
employees of financial institutions.78 Haider eventually settled the 
charges, accepting responsibility and consenting to a $250,000 fine and 
a three-year injunction from performing a compliance function for a 
money transmitting business.79 
3.   FINRA V. AEGIS CAPITAL, CHARLES SMULEVITZ, AND KEVIN 
MCKENNA 
Another noteworthy FINRA case against individual compliance 
officers for AML program deficiencies occurred in August 2015, when 
Aegis, its former CCO Charles Smulevitz, and its former AML 
Compliance Officer Kevin McKenna, consented to the settlement of 
charges relating to their roles in facilitating the sale of unregistered 
securities, in violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.80 
FINRA alleged that, between April 2009 and June 2011, Aegis, a 
retail and institutional broker-dealer, liquidated nearly 3.9 billion shares 
of five “microcap”81 securities that customers deposited into their 
accounts with the firm.82 These shares were not registered with the SEC, 
nor were they subject to an applicable exemption from registration.83 The 
customers generated over $24.5 million from the illicit sales, resulting in 
over $1.1 million in commissions for Aegis.84 FINRA noted that each of 
the customers that had deposited and sold the unregistered shares had 
been referred or controlled by an individual who had previously been the 
subject of three significant regulatory actions, including an SEC 
enforcement proceeding charging the individual with aiding and abetting 
the sale of unregistered securities.85 
 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-1518, at 1–2 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016). 
 78. Id. 
 79. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, Case 0:15-cv-01518-DSD-KMM, ¶ 2 (May 7, 2017) 
(stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal). 
 80. Aegis Capital Corp., supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 81. “Microcap securities” refer to the securities of issuers in the United States that have 
market capitalization between approximately $50 million and $300 million.” Micro Cap, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/microcapstock.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
 82. Aegis Capital Corp., supra note 4, ¶ 1. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. ¶ 2. 
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 The alleged scheme involved the same general fact pattern among 
all clients in question.86 First, a third party acquired a debt instrument 
from the issuer.87 The debt instrument was then held by the acquirer (or 
another third party who acquired the instrument in a subsequent 
purchase) for a period of time.88 The customers thereafter acquired the 
debt instruments from the third party and negotiated with the issuer to 
make the instruments convertible to stock (if they were not already so 
convertible).89 The customers then deposited the shares of the microcap 
stocks into their accounts at Aegis, liquidated the shares shortly after 
deposit, and transferred the proceeds out of their accounts shortly 
following the sales.90 FINRA contended that the sales of the microcap 
securities amounted to a significant percentage of the outstanding shares 
of each issuer.91 
FINRA alleged that Smulevitz and McKenna, during their respective 
tenures as Aegis Compliance Officers, “failed to adequately implement 
the firm’s [AML] program.”92 Specifically, they failed to reasonably 
detect and investigate red flags indicative of potentially suspicious 
transactions, namely: (1) the deposits of billions of shares of unregistered 
microcap securities of ten issuers in several firm accounts; (2) the fact 
that the accounts were referred or controlled by individuals who had 
been the subject of prior regulatory actions, including a proceeding 
related to the sale of unregistered securities; (3) the liquidations of the 
shares shortly after their deposit, sometimes during periods of increased 
promotional activity and trading volume; and (4) the transfers of the 
proceeds of those sales out of the accounts shortly thereafter.93 
FINRA noted that during the relevant period, Aegis did not have any 
specific surveillances or exception reports that addressed anomalous 
transactions in micro-cap securities or penny stocks.94 Nor did it have 
reports or manual procedures to monitor for patterns of deposits and 
liquidations of unregistered securities so as to facilitate the detection, 
investigation and reporting of suspicious activity.95 Moreover, the firm 
failed to maintain adequate evidence that potentially suspicious 
 
 86. Id. ¶ 3. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. ¶ 4. FINRA also charged Aegis with engaging in the distribution of unregistered securities 
in violation of Section 5, as well as the “just and equitable principles of trade” provision of its Rule 
2010. Id. ¶ 110. 
 92. Id. ¶ 7. 
 93. Id. ¶¶ 7, 210–15. 
 94. Id. ¶ 217. 
 95. Id. 
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transaction activity was being investigated and detected.96 Because of 
these failures, Aegis, Smulevitz and McKenna failed to file SARs on the 
aforementioned sales of unregistered securities.97 
Aegis was censured and fined $950,000 for the above-referenced 
violations. Smulevitz and McKenna were fined $5,000 and $10,000, and 
were suspended from associating with any FINRA member for 30 and 60 
days, respectively.98 
4.   FINRA V. RAYMOND JAMES & ASSOCIATES AND LINDA BUSBY 
In May 2016, FINRA entered into a settlement with two of Raymond 
James Financial, Inc.’s broker-dealer subsidiaries, Raymond James & 
Associates (“RJA”), and Raymond James Financial Services (“RJFS”) on 
charges of AML compliance program failures.99 In the same proceeding, 
FINRA settled charges against Linda Busby, RJA’s AML Compliance 
Officer, for the same program infractions.100 
At the time of the alleged misconduct, RJA was a broker-dealer that 
provided execution, clearing and custodial services to retail and 
institutional clients.101 RJA was a broker-dealer engaged in clearing 
services for approximately 40 correspondent firms.102 Busby was RJA’s 
AML compliance officer from 2002 through February 2013.103 
FINRA averred that from 2006 to 2014, RJA and RJFS experienced 
significant growth in their business, but the firms did not dedicate 
sufficient resources to ensure that its AML compliance procedures and 
controls could accommodate the growth.104 More specifically, rather than 
establishing AML programs tailored to each firm’s business, RJA, RJFS, 
and Busby instead relied upon “a patchwork of written procedures and 
systems across different departments to detect suspicious activity.”105 
These disparate systems and procedures were not coordinated to permit 
the firms to link patterns and trends of suspicious behavior, “leaving 
certain risk areas and certain red flags unchecked.”106 FINRA also alleged 
that RJA, RJFS, and Busby failed to conduct required due diligence and 
enhanced due diligence and periodic risk reviews for foreign financial 
institutions.107 
 
 96. Id. ¶ 218. 
 97. Id. ¶¶ 218–22. 
 98. Id. at 51. 
 99. Raymond James & Assoc., Inc., supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 2–3. 
 107. Id. at 3 
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FINRA specifically ascribed to Busby the following AML compliance 
program deficiencies: (1) failing to commit adequate resources to support 
RJA’s and RJFS’s AML compliance programs despite the firms’ 
significant growth;108 (2) failing to implement reasonable written AML 
procedures;109 (3) failing to implement surveillance reports reasonably 
designed to monitor for suspicious activity;110 (4) implementing 
surveillance reports that failed to detect suspicious activity;111  
(5) inadequately investigating those surveillance alerts that did identify 
 
 108. Id. at 4. FINRA contended that during the relevant time period, RJA added approximately 
one thousand registered representatives through the February 2013 acquisition of another broker-
dealer. Id. By June 2014, RJA handled approximately 2 million accounts and cleared and monitored 
trading for more than 30 introducing brokers. Id. RJF had approximately 2 million accounts and 
generated over 51 million transactions. Id. As RJA’s AML Compliance Officer, Busby supervised only 
six AML compliance personnel who, along with two AML compliance personnel at RJF, were 
responsible for reviewing “more than a dozen lengthy AML exception reports for suspicious activity 
across the millions of accounts, filing [SARs] . . . and communicating with branch managers and 
registered representatives regarding client actions and account activity.” Id. FINRA observed that 
RJA’s and RJF’s staffing of their AML compliance groups was “inadequate in light of the extensive 
responsibilities assigned to the few individuals,” including “labor-intensive manual reviews, 
particularly given the firms’ growth during the [r]elevant [p]eriod.” Id. FINRA further noted that RJA 
was aware of FINRA’s concerns about the adequacy of its AML compliance resourcing, but only 
increased its staffing when it added four AML compliance personnel who came with the acquisition of 
another broker-dealer. Id. at 5. 
 109. FINRA highlighted the fact that RJA did not have a single written AML procedures manual, but 
rather the firm’s procedures were scattered through various departments. Id. at 5. In addition, while RJA 
had written procedures relating to the generation of exception reports and review of suspicious trading 
activity, it did not have sufficient written procedures setting forth red flags for suspicious activity. Id. 
Moreover, in its capacity as a clearing firm, RJA allegedly lacked a written supervisory procedure 
requiring it to monitor for suspicious activity in introduced accounts of RFS. Id. Finally, FINRA noted 
that while RJA and RJF had procedures governing the filing of SARs, neither firm had reasonable 
procedures for monitoring and reporting continued or repeated suspicious activity. Id. As a result, the 
firms failed to consider the filing of SARs in cases of continuing activity. Id. 
 110. Id. at 5–6. FINRA alleged that RJA and Busby failed to develop and implement surveillance 
reports tailored to certain types of potentially suspicious transactions, including: funds transfers to 
unrelated accounts without apparent business purpose; journaling cash and securities between 
unrelated accounts for no apparent business purpose; movements of funds from multiple accounts to 
the same third-party account; and high-risk incoming wire activity. Id. at 6. FINRA also noted that 
while RJA and RJS had procedures that required surveillance of accounts with wire activity and no 
securities trading, they did not have surveillance or other means of identifying the reds flags indicative 
of such conduct. Id. As a result, the firms failed to identify five hundred thirteen accounts that engaged 
in such activity. Id. Finally, FINRA found that RJA, RJS, and Busby failed to establish procedures to 
conduct trend or pattern analysis or otherwise view information holistically across multiple 
surveillance reports. Id. 
 111. Id. at 6–7. FINRA cited deficiencies in three surveillance reports utilized by RJA and RJF, and 
implemented by Busby, that resulted in the failure to detect certain suspicious activity. Id. 
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potentially suspicious activity;112 and (6) failing to conduct due diligence 
on certain accounts of foreign financial institutions.113 
In connection with the foregoing and other alleged program 
deficiencies,114 RJA and RJFS consented to censures and fines of  
$8 million and $9 million, respectively.115 Busby was fined $25,000 and 
was suspended from any association with a FINRA member for three 
months.116 
B. THE ADVISERS ACT CASES 
The Advisers Act cases at the center of the recent debate around 
compliance officer liability have involved Rule 206(4)-7.117  
Rule 206(4)-7 is a subsection of Advisers Act Section 206(4), an  
anti-fraud provision that prohibits an investment adviser from 
“engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, 
deceptive, or manipulative.”118 
Adopted in 2003, Rule 206(4)-7 requires registered investment 
advisers to adopt and implement written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to prevent violation of the federal securities laws, 
review those policies and procedures annually for their adequacy and the 
effectiveness of their implementation, and designate a chief compliance 
officer to be “responsible for administering the policies and 
procedures.”119 
 
 112. Id. at 7–8. FINRA noted that at RJF, AML exception reports and alerts generated on 
approximately 140,000 issues during the relevant period, but only 1,800 of these items were escalated 
for further review. Id. at 7. The surveillance reports for RJA generated about 150,000 issues, but only 
about 4,000 were escalated. Id. FINRA also cited five examples of cases where, although RJA and RJF 
analysts identified some red flags and commenced investigations, the investigations were “deficient.” 
Id. at 8. 
 113. Id. at 10–11. FINRA alleged that RJA and Busby failed to obtain key client profile information 
for certain correspondent accounts of foreign financial institutions as prescribed by its procedures, 
thereby limiting its ability to assess the correspondent account’s risk level. Id. In addition, RJA and 
Busby had no reliable periodic review process in place to ensure that the activity in the foreign financial 
institutions’ accounts was consistent with the information supplied by the clients at account opening. Id. 
 114. RJA and RJF were also charged with failure: (1) to maintain written procedures reasonably 
designed to monitor journaling between accounts and to maintain books and records for movements 
of stock to third-party accounts; (2) to maintain an adequate customer identification program; (3) to 
establish, maintain and enforce a supervisory system to achieve compliance with Section 5 of the 
Securities Act of 1933; and (4) to update certain written supervisory procedures related to variable 
annuity transactions. Id. at 10–12. 
 115. Id. at 13–14. 
 116. Id. at 14. 
 117. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2012). 
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (2012). 
 119. Rule 206(4)-7 provides: 
If you are an investment adviser registered or required to be registered under section 203 
of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3), it shall be unlawful within the 
meaning of section 206 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 80b-6) for you to provide investment advice to 
clients unless you: 
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The rule was designed to address a finding by the SEC and state 
securities authorities that some fund advisers, broker-dealers and other 
service providers were engaging in or facilitating inappropriate market 
timing and late trading of fund shares and misusing material, non-public 
information about fund portfolios.120 The SEC and state authorities also 
found that some senior executives of fund advisers had breached their 
fiduciary duties to the funds involved and their shareholders by placing 
their own interests ahead of those of the funds and shareholders.121 The 
SEC noted that the failure of an adviser or a fund to have in place 
adequate compliance controls was something that should be addressed 
before that failure could harm clients or investors.122 
To address the potential failure of an adviser to have adequate 
compliance controls, Rule 206 (4)-7 requires registered investment 
advisers to “adopt and implement written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to prevent violation[s]” of the Advisers Act and 
periodically “[r]eview . . . the adequacy of the policies and procedures . . . 
and the effectiveness of their implementation.”123 In the Adopting 
Release accompanying Rule 206(4)-7, the SEC indicated that the policies 
and procedures should be reasonably designed to prevent violations from 
occurring, detect violations that have occurred, and correct promptly any 
violations that have occurred.124 
Under Rule 206(4)-7, each registered investment adviser must 
designate a CCO. The CCO should be competent and knowledgeable 
regarding the Advisers Act and empowered with “full responsibility and 
authority to develop and enforce appropriate policies and procedures for 
the firm.”125 Rule 206(4)-7 also specifies that the CCO is “responsible for 
administering the [adviser’s] compliance policies and procedures . . . .”126 
 
(a) Policies and procedures. Adopt and implement written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to prevent violation, by you and your supervised persons, of the Act 
and the rules that the Commission has adopted under the Act; 
(b) Annual review. Review, no less frequently than annually, the adequacy of the policies 
and procedures established pursuant to this section and the effectiveness of their 
implementation; and 
(c) Chief compliance officer. Designate an individual (who is a supervised person) 
responsible for administering the policies and procedures that you adopt under paragraph 
(a) of this section. 
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7. 
 120. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714 
(Dec. 24, 2003) (amending 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275, 279), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2204.pdf. 
 121. Id. at 74715. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2012). 
 124. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, supra note 120, at 74716. 
 125. Id. at 74720. 
 126. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(c) (imposing a requirement on registered investment advisers to 
“[d]esignate an individual (who is a supervised person) responsible for administering the policies and 
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The Adopting Release emphasized that the CCO should have a position 
of seniority and authority sufficient to compel others to adhere to the 
compliance policies and procedures.127 
Notably, Rule 206(4)-7 does not require a showing of scienter.128 
The SEC can therefore bring an enforcement action against a compliance 
officer based merely on negligence, alleging that the compliance officer 
“caused” the firm’s violations.129 
Discussions of the most prominent Advisers Act cases follow. 
1.   In the Matter of SFX Financial Advisory Management 
Enterprises, LLC and Eugene S. Mason 
In June 2015, the SEC brought an administrative proceeding 
charging SFX Financial Advisory Management Enterprises (“SFX”), an 
investment adviser that specialized in providing advisory and financial 
management services to high-net worth individuals, and its CCO Eugene 
Mason, with violating Rule 206(4)-7.130 
The SEC alleged from 2006 through 2011, an SFX employee, Brian 
Ourand, misappropriated at least $670,000 from three client accounts 
while serving as SFX’s President and Vice President.131 Specifically, while 
exercising authority over client accounts to pay bills, transfer money, and 
deposit checks, Ourand wrote unauthorized checks from client bank 
accounts payable to “cash” or to himself, and wired the unauthorized 
amounts to himself for his own personal use.132 He also wired money 
using client credit cards for unauthorized amounts to others for their 
personal use.133 
During this time, the SEC contended, SFX failed to supervise the 
employee and committed numerous compliance breaches. First, given 
that individuals at SFX, including Ourand, had full signatory authority 
over client bank accounts relating to SFX’s bill-paying services, “there 
was a significant risk that those individuals could misappropriate client 
funds.”134 The SEC deemed SFX’s compliance policies and procedures, 
for which Mason was responsible, “not reasonably designed” and “not 
 
procedures . . . .”). 
 127. Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, supra note 120, at 74720. 
 128. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[S]cienter is not required under section 
206(4), and the SEC did not have to prove it in order to establish the appellants’ liability . . . .”). 
 129. See Letter from Lisa D. Crossley, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Soc’y of Compliance Prof’ls to Andrew 
Ceresney, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enf’t (Aug. 18, 2015) (requesting that the SEC refrain 
from bringing charges against individual compliance officer based on simple negligence, and instead 
adopt internal guidelines requiring that only intentional or reckless conduct be pursued). 
 130. In the Matter of SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enterprises, Inc., supra note 4, ¶¶ 2, 4, 16–17. 
 131. Id. ¶ 6. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. ¶ 8. 
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effectively implemented” to prevent the misappropriation of client 
funds.135 “In particular, SFX’s policies were not reasonably designed to 
prevent the person authorizing payments from client accounts from 
circumventing a secondary [level of] review of . . . [the] payments.”136 
Furthermore, while SFX’s policy required the existence of a review of 
cash flows in client accounts, SFX and Mason did not effectively 
implement this provision for client accounts used for bill-paying 
services.137  
Second, the SEC alleged that SFX filed a form ADV falsely stating 
that client cash accounts used for bill paying were reviewed several times 
each week by senior management for “accuracy and appropriateness,” 
suggesting a review was being conducted by someone other than 
Ourand.138 In fact, no one other than Ourand was conducting a review of 
the accounts over which he had bill-paying authority.139 
Third, the SEC found that SFX did not conduct an annual review of 
its compliance program in 2011.140 This was so despite the initiation of 
an investigation into Ourand’s conduct.141 The SEC pointed out that 
Mason was responsible for ensuring that the annual review was 
completed and was “negligent in failing to conduct the annual review.”142 
Based on the aforementioned breaches, the SEC determined that 
SFX willfully violated Section 206(4)-7, and that Mason “caused” SFX’s 
violation.143 SFX entered into a settlement pursuant to which it did not 
admit or deny the SEC’s charges and consented to a fine of $150,000, a 
censure, and an order to cease and desist from committing or causing any 
future violations of the applicable provisions of the Advisers Act.144 
Mason entered into a similar “no admit or deny” settlement, was fined 
$25,000, and also was subjected to a cease and desist order.145 
 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. ¶ 9. 
 137. Id. ¶ 10. 
 138. Id. ¶ 11. 
 139. Id. The SEC noted that Mason executed a separate section of the form ADV that was filed 
concurrently with the section containing these allegedly erroneous representations. Id. 
 140. Id. ¶ 12. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. ¶ 12. 
 143. Id. ¶ 16–17. The SEC also alleged that SFX committed the following offenses under the 
Advisers Act: (1) “willfully” violating Section 206(2), which prohibits fraudulent conduct by an 
investment adviser; (2) failing reasonably to supervise Ourand within the meaning of Section 
203(e)(6) of the Investment Act; and (3) willfully violating Section 206 and Rule 206(4)-2 thereunder, 
which requires that an investment adviser have a reasonable basis, after due inquiry, for believing that 
the qualified custodian sends an account statement, at least quarterly, to each of its clients for which 
it maintains funds or securities. Id. ¶ 13–15. 
 144. Id. at 5. 
 145. Id. 
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2.   In the Matter of BlackRock Advisers and Bartholomew 
Battista 
Another noteworthy case holding a CCO personally accountable for 
violating Rule 206(4)-7 occurred in April 2015, when the SEC brought 
charges against BlackRock Advisers, LLC (“BlackRock”) and its CCO, 
Bartholomew Battista.146 The action stemmed from BlackRock’s alleged 
failure to disclose a conflict of interest involving the outside business 
activity of one of its portfolio managers, Daniel Rice III.147 Rice, a  
well-known energy sector portfolio manager, joined BlackRock in 2005 
and managed BlackRock energy-focused registered funds, private funds 
and managed accounts.148 
The SEC alleged that in 2007, Rice founded Rice Energy, L.P., an oil 
and natural gas production company that was owned and operated by the 
Rice family.149 Rice was the general partner of Rice Energy and personally 
invested approximately $50 million in the company, while his three sons 
served as CEO, CFO, and Vice President of Geology.150 In February 2010, 
during Rice’s tenure as a BlackRock portfolio manager, Rice Energy 
formed a joint venture with Alpha Natural Resources, Inc. (“ANR”), a 
publicly traded coal company held in the BlackRock funds and accounts 
managed by Rice.151 By the end of the first quarter of 2010, the  
Rice-managed BlackRock funds and separate accounts held over two 
million shares of ANR, with the largest fund’s position in ANR 
representing one of its largest holding by June 2011.152 
The SEC contended that by no later than January 2007, BlackRock 
learned that Rice had formed and funded a family trust to hold interests 
in energy companies Rice intended to create, in violation of BlackRock’s 
private investment policy.153 Moreover, by at least that time, certain 
BlackRock senior executives, including Battista, were told that Rice 
intended to form and fund Rice Energy.154 BlackRock’s Legal and 
Compliance Department, including Battista, reviewed and discussed the 
matter and allowed Rice to form the company, concluding that no conflict 
of interest existed.155 By January 2010, BlackRock learned that Rice made 
loans of approximately $14 million to a Rice Energy subsidiary in 
violation of its private investment policy.156 
 
 146. See In the Matter of Blackrock Advisors, LLC, supra note 4, at 1. 
 147. Id. ¶ 1. 
 148. Id. ¶¶ 1, 8. 
 149. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9–12. 
 150. Id. ¶¶ 1, 14. 
 151. Id. ¶ 1. 
 152. Id. ¶¶ 1, 15. 
 153. Id. ¶ 16. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. ¶ 16. 
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In January 2010, Rice advised BlackRock that he wanted to serve on 
the board of directors of the joint venture between Rice Energy and 
ANR.157 Not recalling its initial review of Rice Energy in 2007, 
BlackRock’s Legal and Compliance Department conducted a  
fact-gathering exercise that resulted in the issuance of a February 2010 
memorandum to Rice identifying potential conflicts of interest inherent 
in Rice’s entering into joint ventures with companies he held in the 
BlackRock portfolios he managed.158 The memorandum also expressed 
concern that Rice may gain access to information regarding ANR that 
could be used for his personal benefit rather than that of his BlackRock 
clients.159 Rice was nevertheless permitted to continue managing the 
ANR stock positions he managed on behalf of BlackRock clients subject 
to certain restrictions.160 
The SEC alleged that BlackRock failed to inform the boards of 
directors of the Rice-managed registered funds and advisory clients 
about Rice’s involvement with, and investment in, Rice Energy.161 It also 
charged BlackRock and Battista with failing to have written policies and 
procedures governing the manner in which the outside activities of its 
employees were to be assessed, as well as assigning responsibility for 
determining whether the outside activity should be permitted.162 It 
further faulted BlackRock and Battista for failing to adopt and implement 
policies and procedures to monitor those employees’ approved outside 
activities.163 Finally, the SEC found that BlackRock and Battista failed to 
inform the boards of the Rice-managed registered funds that Rice 
violated the firm’s private investment policy by not obtaining  
pre-approval to form and fund the trust and to make approximately  
$14 million in loans.164 
The SEC determined that BlackRock willfully violated Section 
206(4) and Rule 206(4)-7 thereunder and that Battista “caused 
BlackRock’s compliance-related violations.”165 BlackRock entered into a 
“no admit, no deny” settlement under which it agreed to pay a $12 million 
 
 157. Id. ¶ 18. 
 158. Id. ¶¶ 18–19.  
 159. Id. ¶¶ 19–20. 
 160. Id. ¶ 20. These included not exercising decision making authority over the joint venture, and 
not receiving information that could limit his ability to freely trade ANR securities.  
 161. Id. ¶ 23. 
 162. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. 
 163. Id. ¶ 28. 
 164. Id. ¶¶ 31–33. 
 165. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. The SEC also charged BlackRock with willfully violating the Investment 
Adviser’s Act prohibition, under Section 206(2), against engaging in fraud. Id. It further charged 
BlackRock and Battista with causing certain BlackRock funds violations of Rule 38-1(a) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, which requires registered investment companies, through their 
CCO, to provide a written report at least annually to the fund’s board of directors that addresses 
“material” compliance matters. Id. 
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penalty, accept a censure, and retain a consultant to review its 
compliance policies and procedures regarding the outside activities of its 
employees.166 Battista settled the charges on a “no admit, no deny” basis 
as well, agreed to pay a $60,000 penalty, and was censured.167 
II.  THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS  
AGAINST FINANCIAL SECTOR COMPLIANCE OFFICERS 
The wave of recent enforcement actions against individual financial 
sector compliance officers stimulated a spirited discussion in the media 
and among industry commentators as to the implications of this trend.168 
Many commentators questioned whether the cases signaled a strategic 
shift among regulators such that compliance officers presumptively 
would be held personally responsible for their institutions’ control 
failures.169 Reports also surfaced of an emerging fear among financial 
institution compliance officers that they were being unfairly targeted.170 
 
 166. Id. ¶ 37; Id. at 12. 
 167. Id. at 12. 
 168. See Causey, supra note 5; DiPietro, supra note 5; Ensign, supra note 5; Glazer, supra note 5;  
Kelly, supra note 5; DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 3. 
 169. See, e.g., Aguilar, supra note 1 (“The Blackrock and SFX enforcement actions . . . continue a 
trend toward strict liability for CCOs that unfairly holds them accountable for compliance failures they 
cannot control”); Kelly, supra note 5 (“One surprising conversation to arise in the compliance world 
last year was the sudden worry about compliance officer liability: the idea that you, the head of 
compliance at your firm, might be held responsible because some other employee violated the rules 
and committed some form of misconduct”); Hazel Bradford, Chief Compliance Officers Prepare for 
Closer SEC Scrutiny, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Jan. 11, 2016), http://www.pionline.com/article/ 
20160111/PRINT/301119976/chief-compliance-officers-prepare-for-closer-sec-scrutiny (“[T]he 
SEC’s oversight of compliance officers is changing in tone. . . . Now . . . the tone has turned a little more 
skeptical.’’) (quoting Karen Barr, President and CEO of the Inv. Adviser Ass’n); Timothy Bernstein, 
How Much is Too Much? The Over-Enforcement of Compliance Officers, NEW OAK (Aug. 27, 2015), 
http://newoak.com/thought-leadership/much-much-enforcement-compliance-officers/ (“A growing 
body of . . . precedent is slowly shifting the regulatory failings of organizations onto their chief 
compliance officers . . . at least when they are around to take the blame.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 5 (reporting that in the wake of recent enforcement actions 
“[c]ompliance officers are ‘shaking in their boots’” and “feel unfairly singled out”); Ensign, supra note 
5 (“[R]ecent high profile cases against compliance officers have stirred fears of liability among 
practitioners in this field. Some now say they worry that they could be penalized for decisions they 
make in the course of their work.”); Causey, supra note 5 (“While banking may be the business of risk 
management, personal liability for CCOs puts them in a serious predicament of assessing business risk 
appetites against their own. Compliance is challenging enough without personal liability. Is the CCO 
the correct target?”); DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 3 (describing “waves of apprehension 
through the corporate compliance world”); Jacob Decker, Investment Adviser Chief Compliance 
Officer Liability: Is the SEC Overreaching?, WOODRUFF-SAWYER (Aug. 31, 2015), 
https://wsandco.com/industry-matters/investment-adviser/ (“Compliance officers have reason to 
feel uneasy. They have been tasked with an increasing number of responsibilities, asked to manage a 
complex variety of compliance risks, and often wear multiple hats . . . . Finally, and notably, the SEC 
recently imposed personal fines against two high-profile CCOs in response to their alleged failure to 
implement the firm’s policies and procedures.”); Chris Kentouris, Compliance Officers: Taking the 
Regulatory Heat, Personally, FINOPS REP. (Apr. 1, 2014), http://finops.co/regulations/ 
compliance-officers-taking-the-regulatory-heat-personally/ (“We’re caught between a rock and a hard 
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A. THE REGULATORS’ INITIAL RESPONSE 
The regulators’ response to these concerns varied over time. At the 
outset, it was unclear whether they were even conscious that their actions 
could be perceived as targeting. 
In connection with its record settlement against Brown Brothers, for 
example, FINRA offered little in defense of its decision to charge Harold 
Crawford personally.171 In a February 2014 press release announcing the 
settlement, FINRA focused instead on the allegations against the firm 
itself.172 The press release specifically highlighted the fact that Brown 
Brothers: (1) executed transactions or delivered securities involving at 
least six billion shares of penny stocks, many on behalf of undisclosed 
customers of foreign banks in known bank secrecy havens; (2) that the 
transactions were executed despite the fact that the firm was unable to 
establish that the shares were freely tradable; and (3) in many instances 
the firm lacked basic information necessary to detect the presence of red 
flags.173 
In a statement accompanying the press release, Brad Bennett, 
FINRA’s Executive Vice President and Chief of Enforcement, 
concentrated on Brown Brothers’ program failures: 
The firm opened its doors to undisclosed sellers of penny stocks from 
secrecy havens without regard for who was behind those transactions, 
or whether the stock was properly registered or exempt from 
registration. This case is a reminder to firms of what can happen if they 
choose to engage in the penny stock liquidation business when they 
lack the ability to manage the risks involved.174 
Notably, FINRA’s press release made no mention of Crawford’s 
conduct, let alone attempt to justify charges against him.175 
When FinCEN announced the penalty against Thomas Haider 
several months later, the emphasis shifted. Unlike FINRA’s press release 
in Brown Brothers, FinCEN focused exclusively on Haider’s role in 
MoneyGram’s alleged program failures. FinCEN first noted that Haider 
was responsible for monitoring MoneyGram’s network of agents and, 
based on the complaints to which he was privy, “could have suspended 
or terminated any agents that were participating in illicit activity.”176 
 
place,” one compliance officer at a New York brokerage tells FinOps. “We can provide the best advice 
possible, but if it falls on deaf ears, we’re the ones paying the price.”). 
 171. See FINRA Brown Brothers Press Release, supra note 57. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN Assesses $1 Million Penalty and Seeks 
to Bar Former MoneyGram Executive from Financial Industry (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-assesses-1-million-penalty-and-seeks-bar-
former-moneygram-executive. 
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Haider’s inaction, the agency claimed, “led to thousands of innocent 
individuals being duped out of millions of dollars through fraud schemes 
that funneled, and sometimes laundered, their illicit profits through 
MoneyGram’s money transmission network.”177 FinCEN also pointed out 
that Haider “failed in his responsibility to ensure the filing of suspicious 
activity reports . . . on agents whom he . . . had reason to suspect were 
engaged in fraud, money laundering, or other criminal activity.”178 
In an early sign of regulatory sensitivity to potential perception 
issues stemming from charging compliance officers, FinCEN Director 
Jennifer Shasky issued a statement accompanying the Haider press 
release, calling the hundreds of compliance officers she had met “some 
of the most dedicated and trustworthy professionals in the financial 
industry.”179 She then drew a stark contrast between the compliance 
function generally and Haider’s conduct, which she portrayed as “an 
affront to his peers and to his profession.”180 “With his willful violations,” 
Shasky said, Haider “created an environment where fraud and money 
laundering thrived and dirty money rampaged through the very system 
he was charged with protecting.”181 
Preet Bharara, then U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York, whose office simultaneously filed a complaint in federal court to 
enforce FinCEN’s sanction against Haider, echoed Shasky’s message of 
support for compliance professionals, opining that “[c]ompliance officers 
perform an essential function in our society, serving as the first line of 
defense in the fight against fraud and money laundering.”182 Like Shasky, 
moreover, Bharara portrayed Haider as an extreme outlier: 
Unfortunately . . . Mr. Haider violated his obligations as MoneyGram’s 
Chief Compliance Officer. By allegedly failing to take the actions clearly 
required of him under the law, he allowed criminals to use MoneyGram 
to defraud innocent consumers and then launder the proceeds of their 
fraudulent schemes.183 
As with FINRA’s press release in Brown Brothers, FinCEN’s 
approach to the Haider announcement primarily focused on the factual 
allegations of the case at hand. No broader effort was undertaken to 
justify the regulators’ charging practices or to address the policy 
implications of charging individual compliance officers. 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. 
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B. SEC COMMISSIONER GALLAGHER’S DISSENT IN SFX AND BLACKROCK 
The decisive point in the evolution of the regulators’ reaction to 
concerns about compliance officer targeting came in June 2015. It was 
then that SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher issued an unusual public 
statement explaining the rationale for his dissenting votes in the 
Commission’s approvals of the SFX and BlackRock settlements.184 In so 
doing, he raised broader policy concerns about the consequences of 
charging compliance officers individually. 
Gallagher expressed the view that the “settlements illustrate[d] a 
Commission trend toward strict liability for CCOs under  
Rule 206(4)-7.”185 For Gallagher, this trend sent a “troubling message” 
that CCOs should avoid taking ownership of their firm’s compliance 
policies and procedures, so as to avoid being held accountable for 
conduct that, under Rule 206(4)-7, is the responsibility of the investment 
adviser itself.186 Worse still, he posited that the cases could influence 
CCOs to opt for less comprehensive policies and procedures with fewer 
specified compliance responsibilities “to avoid liability when the 
government plays Monday morning quarterback.”187 
Gallagher observed that Rule 206(4)-7 “offers no guidance as to the 
distinction between the role of CCOs and management in carrying out 
the compliance function.”188 He accused the SEC of supplying guidance 
via enforcement actions that “have unfairly contorted the rule to treat the 
compliance function as a new business line, with compliance officers 
assuming the role of business heads.”189 Gallagher pointed out that the 
rule confers responsibility on investment advisers to designate a CCO to 
administer its compliance policies and procedures, but that ultimate 
responsibility for implementation rested with the adviser.190 Gallagher 
noted a “significant risk” at such firms that by taking ownership of the 
implementation of the policies and procedures, CCOs could unwittingly 
also be taking ownership of business functions, thereby “subjecting them 
to strict liability whenever there is a violation of the securities laws.”191 
Gallagher cautioned that the SEC needed to be “especially cognizant 
of the messages it sends to the compliance community.”192 He specifically 
warned against the potential chilling effect of such enforcement actions: 
 
 184. Daniel Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Recent SEC Settlements 
Charging Chief Compliance Officers with Violations of Investment Advisers Act Rule 206(4)-7,  
(June 18, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/sec-cco-settlements-iaa-rule-206-4-7.html. 
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[A]s regulators, we should strive to avoid the perverse incentives that 
will naturally flow from targeting compliance personnel who are 
willing to run into the fires that so often occur at regulated entities. This 
includes exercising restraint and discretion even at the investigation 
stage. The psychological impact, and in many cases reputational 
damage, that can come with months or years of testimony, the Wells 
process, and settlement negotiations can be just as chilling as the 
scarlet letter of an enforcement violation.193 
Gallagher concluded by observing that “[t]he status quo simply will 
not do.”194 By continuing to follow the same approach to compliance 
officer liability, he said, “the Commission seems to be cutting off the 
noses of CCOs to spite its face.”195 
C. THE SEC’S RESPONSE TO GALLAGHER’S DISSENTS 
Commissioner Gallagher’s public dissents in SFX and BlackRock 
garnered a significant amount of public attention.196 Many 
commentators seized on his criticism of the SFX and BlackRock cases as 
evidence that the SEC was unfairly targeting CCOs and foisting on them 
a degree of responsibility that rightfully belonged to their firms.197 
Concerned that the Gallagher dissent and its resulting publicity had 
created an environment of “unwarranted fear” within the CCO 
community, the SEC mounted a defense of its actions in the form of a 
series of statements from key officials over the course of several 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 5; Aguilar, supra note 1; Mark Schoeff Jr., SEC’s Gallagher Says 
Agency Unfairly Cracks Down on Compliance Officers, INVESTMENTNEWS (June 18, 2015), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150618/FREE/150619901/secs-gallagher-says-agency-
unfairly-cracks-down-on-compliance; Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC Too Tough on Compliance 
Officers, Gallagher Says, LAW360 (June 18, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/669779/ 
sec-too-tough-on-compliance-officers-gallagher-says; Alex Padalka, Commissioner Says the SEC 
Picks on Compliance Officers, FIN. ADVISOR IQ (June 22, 2015), http://financialadvisoriq.com/ 
c/1142383/123533/charged_with_fraud_penny_stock_case. 
 197. See, e.g., Schoeff Jr., supra note 196 (“Securities and Exchange Commission member Daniel 
M. Gallagher said the agency unfairly targeted chief compliance officers in recent enforcement actions 
and is leaving them unsure of the extent of their responsibility for firm behavior.”); Aguilar, supra 
note 1 (“The Blackrock and SFX enforcement actions . . . continue a trend toward strict liability for 
CCOs that unfairly holds them accountable for compliance failures they cannot control.”); Aguilar, 
supra note 1 (“Under the status quo Gallagher worries that CCOs may decide to have less stringent 
policies that are easier to implement so that they can’t be held liable for any wrongdoing. Even worse, 
compliance personnel may not want to dig too deeply into potential problems if they are unsure 
whether or not they could be on the hook for any misconduct that they uncover.”); Russell-Kraft, supra 
note 196 (“[T]he agency is taking too harsh of an enforcement stance against chief compliance officers, 
treating them too much like management and not like the gatekeepers they are.”); Padalka, supra note 
196 (“[T]he SEC has a habit of forcing compliance officers to enforce compliance procedures that aren’t 
always suited to—or even strict enough for—some practices and then to take responsibility for the 
actions of colleagues when in-house rules fall short.”). 
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months.198 First, in June 2015, within two weeks of the issuance of the 
Gallagher dissent, SEC Commissioner Luis Aguilar issued an equally 
unusual public response.199 
Aguilar began by expressing the view that “most CCOs take their 
job[s] seriously and are a credit to the compliance community.”200 He 
offered assurance that CCOs who “faithfully and reasonably fulfill the 
requirements of Rule 206(4)-7 are not going to be subject[s] of SEC 
enforcement actions.”201 Gallagher noted that since the adoption of the 
rule, enforcement proceedings against individuals who exclusively 
perform the function of CCO have been rare.202 Two of the cases, he said 
in reference to SFX and BlackRock, “were recently settled in 2015 and 
have been the catalyst for the recent concerns that CCOs are being 
targeted.”203 
Aguilar asserted that the facts in SFX and BlackRock reflected 
“egregious misconduct” on the part of the CCOs in question and did not 
“signify the beginning of some nefarious trend to use Rule 206(4)-7 to 
target CCOs.”204 He concluded by stressing that “CCOs are vital to the 
protection of investors and the integrity of the capital markets.”205 “To 
that end,” he said, “the Commission works to support CCOs who strive to 
do their jobs competently, diligently, and in good faith¾and these CCOs 
should have nothing to fear from the SEC.”206 
Aguilar’s message was reinforced through a series of subsequent 
public statements by SEC Chair Mary Jo White, SEC Division of 
Enforcement Director Andrew Ceresney, and other officials over the 
course of the next several months.207 In a July 2015 address to a group of 
compliance professionals from the brokerage community, for example, 
Chair White spoke directly to the standards the SEC applies in deciding 
to charge a compliance officer: 
 
 198. See Ceresney, supra note 1; Aguilar, supra note 1; Andrew Ceresney, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n Div. of Enf’t, Keynote Address at Compliance Week 2014 (May 20, 2014), https://www.sec. 
gov/news/speech/2014-spch052014ajchttp://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/137054187 
2207 [hereinafter Ceresney Compliance Week Address]; Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Compliance Outreach Program for Broker-Dealers (July 15, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/opening-remarks-compliance-outreach-program-for-broker-
dealers.html; Andrew Donohue, Chief of Staff, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at NRS 30th 
Annual Fall Investment Adviser and Broker-Dealer Compliance Conference (Oct. 14, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/donohue-nrs-30th-annual.html. 
 199. Aguilar, supra note 1. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
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 206. Id. 
 207. See Ceresney, supra note 1; White, supra note 198; Donohue, supra note 198. 
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[I]t is not our intention to use our enforcement program to target 
compliance professionals. We have tremendous respect for the work 
that you do . .  . . That being said, we must, of course, take enforcement 
action against compliance professionals if we see significant 
misconduct or failures by them. Being a CCO obviously does not 
provide immunity from liability, but neither should our enforcement 
actions be seen by conscientious and diligent compliance professionals 
as a threat. We do not bring cases based on second guessing compliance 
officers’ good faith judgments, but rather when their actions or 
inactions cross a clear line that deserve sanction.208 
A more robust defense of SEC charging practices came in November 
2015, when Enforcement Director Ceresney addressed the National 
Society of Compliance Professionals.209 Ceresney began by 
acknowledging that “recent enforcement actions by the Commission 
against compliance personnel in the investment adviser space have 
caused concern in the compliance community.”210 He emphasized that 
compliance officers had no reason to fear enforcement action if they 
performed their responsibilities “diligently, in good faith, and in 
compliance with the law.”211 
Ceresney noted that the SEC takes the question of whether to charge 
a CCO “very seriously” and “consider[s] it carefully.”212 “We think very 
hard about when to bring these cases,” he said, “[w]hen we do, it is 
because the facts demonstrate that the CCO’s conduct crossed a clear 
line.”213 
Ceresney pointed out that when the SEC brings enforcement actions 
against CCOs, they generally fall into three categories: (1) CCOs who are 
affirmatively involved in misconduct that is unrelated to the compliance 
functions;214 (2) CCOs who engage in efforts to obstruct or mislead the 
Commission staff; or (3) CCOs who have “exhibited a wholesale failure to 
 
 208. White, supra note 198. 
 209. See Ceresney, supra note 1. 
 210. Id.; see also Donohue, supra note 198 (“Following [the SFX and BlackRock] cases, there was 
a lot of discussion about whether the Commission was targeting CCOs.”). 
 211. Ceresney, supra note 1; see also White, supra note 198 (“Being a CCO obviously does not 
provide immunity from liability, but neither should our enforcement actions be seen by conscientious 
and diligent compliance professionals as a threat.”); Donohue, supra note 198 (“[C]ompliance officers 
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Mary Jo White had delivered a similar message to the National Society of Compliance Professionals 
two years earlier. Ceresney, supra note 1 (quoting White, supra note 1). 
 212. Ceresney, supra note 1. 
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carry out his or her responsibilities.”215 He noted that it was the latter 
category, which included the SFX and BlackRock cases, that had drawn 
significant attention.216 
Ceresney also emphasized that the number of cases of the sort the 
SEC brings for wholesale compliance failures “is considerably smaller.”217 
Specifically, he cited statistics demonstrating that from 2003 to 2015, the 
SEC brought more than 8,000 enforcement actions, approximately 1,300 
of which involved investment advisers or investment companies.218 
During this period, only five enforcement actions were brought against 
individuals with CCO-only titles for Rule 206(4)-7 and other 
compliance-related failures, where efforts to obstruct or mislead the SEC 
were not at issue.219 For Ceresney, these numbers confirmed that the SEC 
only rarely charges CCOs for wholesale compliance failures under Rule 
206(4)-7, and that the SFX and BlackRock cases “d[id] not signal a 
change in how Enforcement staff or the Commission approaches the 
issue of CCO liability.”220 Rather, the facts clearly showed why the SEC 
held the CCOs liable for their firm’s compliance failures.221 
In the case of BlackRock, Ceresney noted that the CCO failed to 
develop written policies and procedures to assess and monitor the 
outside activities of its employees despite being on notice of “red flags,” 
including the fact the CCO “knew of and approved numerous outside 
activities engaged in by BlackRock employees,” and that he was “involved 
in extended discussions about a significant outside family business of a 
senior portfolio manager that posed a conflict with the investments his 
funds held.”222 In the case of SFX, Ceresney pointed out that the CCO 
failed to ensure that any review of cash flows in client accounts occurred 
for more than five years despite the fact that “[t]he firm’s policies and 
 
 215. Id.; Donohue, supra note 198 (citing the same three categories and opining that, “[i]n light of 
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procedures specifically assigned the CCO with responsibility” to 
implement such a review.223 
Ceresney concluded by assuring compliance officers that the SEC 
fully supported and relied on them as “essential partners in ensuring 
compliance with the federal securities laws.”224 He stressed that, “[as] 
reflected in the small number of enforcement actions brought against 
CCOs for their compliance work, and the clear facts in each of those 
actions, we decide to recommend charging a CCO only when warranted 
after a thorough analysis of the facts and circumstances and 
consideration of fairness and equity.”225 
D. FINRA’S POST-GALLAGHER DISSENT STATEMENTS 
While the SEC engaged in what appears to have been a concerted 
effort to defend its approach to charging compliance officers following 
the Gallagher dissent, FINRA also took steps publicly to justify its 
actions. In April 2016, at a gathering of securities industry legal and 
compliance professionals, Enforcement Director Brad Bennett explained 
the review process FINRA undertakes when considering charging 
compliance officers.226 “When we look at cases and charging decisions,” 
Bennett said, “we look at potential liability for individuals in every 
case.”227 He delineated as among the factors FINRA considers 
“recidivism;” “[the] extent the individual was involved in the  
wrong-doing;” “the extent of underlying conduct and degree of investor 
harm;” and “willful blindness or intentional participation in the 
violations.”228 
Bennett compared two cases in which FINRA charged firms with 
AML failures relating to penny-stock controls¾one in which compliance 
officers were charged, and another in which they were not charged.229 
While he did not identify it by name, the case that resulted in charges 
against the compliance officers appears to have been against Aegis, 
 
 223. Id.; see also Donohue, supra note 198 (citing the same facts as justification for the charges 
against the CCOs in SFX and BlackRock). 
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Smulevitz and McKenna.230 Bennett pointed to specific facts that 
“differentiated the outcomes” for the compliance officers in both cases.231 
Specifically, Bennett accused Smulevitz and McKenna of implementing a 
supervisory system that was “more concerned with generating 
commissions than it was with complying with laws and regulations.”232 
According to Bennett, Smulevitz and McKenna “unreasonably” 
relied on representations from customers and their counsel without 
verifying the information.233 Additionally, “[t]hey also did not consider 
patterns of deposits and liquidations of microcap securities to be a red 
flag that required investigation or inquiry.”234 By comparison, Bennett 
noted that the compliance officer who had not been charged “made 
numerous attempts to question the activity and inadequate supervisory 
systems” and was overruled by the business.235 In short, Bennett claimed, 
Smulevitz and McKenna were held personally accountable because they 
“did little to nothing to question or stop the sales of billions of shares of 
microcap stock dumped into the marketplace through the firm.”236 
In May 2016, one month after Bennett’s remarks, FINRA offered a 
more refined statement of its rationale for charging compliance officers 
when it announced its settlement with Raymond James and AML Officer 
Linda Busby.237 In a press release accompanying the settlement, FINRA 
concentrated as much on Busby’s alleged failures as those of the firm. In 
particular, FINRA accused RJA and Busby of being unable to keep pace 
with the firm’s protracted growth and establish AML programs tailored 
to each firm’s business.238 RJA and Busby were faulted for relying upon 
a patchwork of written procedures and systems across different 
departments to detect suspicious activity, which caused “red flags” of 
potentially suspicious activity that went undetected or inadequately 
investigated.239 FINRA also cited RJA’s failure to conduct required due 
diligence and periodic risk reviews for foreign financial institutions, and 
Busby’s failure to ensure that those reviews were conducted.240 
FINRA went beyond merely focusing on Busby’s alleged 
misconduct, however. In a statement accompanying the press release, 
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Executive Vice President and Enforcement Chief Brad Bennett 
articulated a standard for holding compliance officers accountable: 
Raymond James had significant systemic AML failures over an 
extended period of time, made even more egregious by the fact that the 
firm was previously sanctioned in this area. The monitoring for 
suspicious transactions is an essential part of protecting our financial 
system and firms must allocate adequate resources to their AML 
compliance efforts. This case demonstrates that when there are broad-
based failures within specific areas of responsibility, we will seek 
individual liability where appropriate.241 
With the portrayal of Busby’s conduct as “broad-based failures 
within specific areas of responsibility,” FINRA established a standard 
closely resembling that which SEC Enforcement Director Ceresney 
invoked in justifying individual CCO charges in SFX, BlackRock and 
similar cases¾namely, a “wholesale failures in carrying out 
responsibilities.”242 
E. THE RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF COMPLIANCE OFFICER TARGETING 
Taken as a whole, the regulators’ public statements reflect the 
following rationale in support of their compliance officer charging 
practices. As a threshold matter, the cases in which compliance officers 
are charged with wholesale or broad-based failures are rare.243 When 
they do occur, they are subject to careful consideration, and charges are 
only brought when the evidence demonstrates that a clear line was 
crossed.244 Under these circumstances, the behavior at issue is as 
problematic as it would be if the compliance officer had engaged in 
collusive or obstructive misconduct, and the targeting of compliance 
officers is entirely appropriate.245 
A possible additional justification for the regulators’ approach to 
compliance officer charging is the notion that personal liability 
encourages a greater degree of vigilance by compliance officers.246 
According to this line of reasoning, the specter of personal liability 
provides the requisite incentive for compliance officers to implement 
strong, effective compliance programs.247 It also offers more inducement 
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for compliance officers to challenge management over risky or 
questionable behavior.248 
While no senior regulatory official has publicly acknowledged the 
potential for increased vigilance to be a factor influencing their agency’s 
stance on compliance officer liability, one interested party has suggested 
that it should be. In a letter to SEC Enforcement Director Ceresney, Lisa 
Crossley, Executive Director of the National Society of Compliance 
Professionals, framed the policy debate around compliance officer 
liability as one in which the potential for encouraging greater vigilance 
should be weighed against the possible downsides of perceived targeting: 
“[W]e submit that a fundamental policy question is whether enforcement 
actions against compliance officers will motivate them to greater 
vigilance or risk a demoralizing belief that even exercising their best 
judgment will not protect them from the risk of [. . .] enforcement 
action . . . .”249 
III.  THE ENDURING PERCEPTION OF TARGETING AND ITS “CHILLING 
EFFECT” ON FINANCIAL SECTOR COMPLIANCE OFFICERS 
A. THE CHILLING EFFECT 
As the foregoing Part suggests, regulators have engaged in a 
significant, public campaign to mollify the concerns of financial sector 
compliance officers regarding targeting. Despite these efforts, however, 
the perception of targeting has endured and has had a demonstrable 
chilling effect on compliance officers. 
In February 2016, The Wall Street Journal reported that “[a]round 
three dozen senior bank-compliance executives left their jobs in 2015,” 
three times the number that had done so the year before.250 A recent 
survey of CCOs conducted by the law firm DLA Piper also revealed that 
“81 percent of respondents were at least somewhat concerned” about 
their personal liability, with nearly a third describing personal liability as 
“extremely concerning.”251 A 2015 Thompson Reuters survey of 
approximately 600 compliance professionals further indicated that 59 
percent expected their personal liability to increase over time.252 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Crossley, supra note 129, at 2. 
 250. See Glazer, supra note 5; see also DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5. 
 251. DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5. 
 252. Thomson Reuters Annual Cost of Compliance Survey Shows Regulatory Fatigue, Resource 
Challenges and Personal Liability to Increase Throughout 2015, THOMSON REUTERS (May 13, 2015), 
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Anecdotally, one online financial industry publication reported that ten 
compliance officers at U.S. banks and broker-dealers who had been 
contacted said they were in a “no-win situation and short of resigning can 
do little to reduce their personal liability.”253 
In addition to the potential “chilling effect” on current senior 
compliance professionals, there is evidence that the prospect of personal 
liability is causing future leaders in financial sector compliance to 
reconsider their career paths.254 Sixty percent of the CCOs of public 
companies surveyed by DLA Piper said they would think more carefully 
about roles they might consider given the specter of personal liability.255 
In addition, approximately two-thirds of the compliance professionals 
who responded to the Thomson Reuters survey reported that the focus 
on individual accountability would have an impact on their ability to 
recruit skilled senior staff.256 
In sum, the regulators’ efforts to allay compliance officer fears and 
to justify the recent enforcement actions against their peers as 
appropriate responses to wholesale or broad-based program failures, 
seem to have had little impact on the perception of targeting or its 
attendant “chilling effect.” The perception has persisted, and seems to be 
causing people to exit¾or at least consider exiting¾the compliance 
profession, if not the industry more broadly. 
B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE ENDURING PERCEPTIONS  
OF TARGETING 
There is little basis for questioning the validity of senior law 
enforcement and regulatory officials’ expressions of esteem and support 
for the financial sector compliance function.257 Nor is there reason to 
doubt regulators’ representations that enforcement actions against 
individual compliance officers are the product of careful consideration 
and are undertaken only when supported by evidence indicating that a 
clear line was crossed.258 Given that regulators’ efforts to quell the sense 
of anxiety among compliance, nevertheless, have had little effect, we 
must consider what other causes could be responsible for the prevailing 
perception of compliance officer targeting persists. 
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The following factors, either alone or in combination, may be 
contributing to this trend. 
1.   The Aggregate Impact of Recent Enforcement Actions 
The first, and perhaps the most obvious, is the aggregate impact of 
recent enforcement actions. SEC Enforcement Director Ceresney and 
other SEC officials have proffered compelling statistics to demonstrate 
that the number of cases the Commission has brought against 
compliance officers for causing a violation of law, in the absence of 
allegations of willful misconduct or obstruction, is an extremely small 
fraction of the whole.259 Indeed, this appears to be the case with all of the 
agencies that have brought recent cases against financial sector 
compliance officers.260 
Yet when the average compliance officer observes not just the SEC 
bringing highly publicized cases,261 but the SEC and FinCEN,262 and 
FINRA, then perhaps it is the totality of these actions that catches their 
attention, rather than the merits of any individual case. This is especially 
so when the enforcement actions are brought by these various agencies 
relatively close in time. The fact that it has been historically rare for these 
agencies to bring personal charges against financial sector compliance 
officers may therefore offer scarce comfort when they appear to be doing 
so presently. 
2.   The “Isolation Factor” 
The second possible explanation for the perception of targeting can 
be termed the “isolation factor.” One common feature linking Brown 
Brothers, Haider, Raymond James, Aegis, BlackRock, SFX, and the 
other highly publicized enforcement actions charging financial 
compliance officers with wholesale or broad-based program failures is 
the fact that, in each of these cases, the compliance officer was the only 
individual charged. Indeed, a substantial number of the enforcement 
cases brought against individual compliance officers in the past several 
 
 259. See supra notes 7–9, 202, 213, 225 and accompanying text. 
 260. See FinCEN Seeks Civil Money Penalty and Injunction Against Former Chief Compliance 
Officer of MoneyGram, SIDLEY (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.sidley.com/news/2015-01-02_banking 
_and_financial_services_update (“The Complaint [against Thomas Haider] is significant because it is 
highly uncommon, and possibly unprecedented, for FinCEN to hold a compliance officer personally 
responsible for the AML failures of an employer.”). See Enforcement Actions, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T 
NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/news-room/enforcement-actions (last visited Nov. 21, 2017). 
 261. See In the Matter of SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enterprises, Inc., supra note 4; In the Matter 
of Blackrock Advisors, LLC, supra note 4; see also supra notes 130–167 and accompanying text. 
 262. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, No. 15-1518 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016); Raymond James 
& Assoc., Inc., supra note 4; Aegis, supra note 4; Brown Brothers Consent, supra note 4. 
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years have not included charges against other senior business or  
control-side personnel.263 
Of the cases brought by the SEC, FinCEN, and FINRA over the past 
two years in which compliance officers holding just that title have been 
charged with program failures, the majority have included charges 
against other parties associated with the infractions in question.264 That 
any enforcement action that fails to allege collusion or obstruction could 
proceed against a compliance officer in isolation, however, is cause for 
concern. 
The success of a financial institution’s compliance program depends 
on the efforts of multiple stakeholders, including compliance, legal, 
operations, and, of course, the business. Indeed, regulators view the 
business as the “first line of defense” with primary responsibility for 
implementing internal controls.265 Compliance and other control 
functions are considered the “second line,” responsible for unearthing 
issues that are not captured by the first line.266 
Thus, imposing personal liability on compliance officers for the 
frailties of their firms’ compliance programs only addresses one part of 
the equation. Each line of defense should operate in a robust and effective 
fashion toward the shared goal of strengthening a financial firm’s overall 
control environment. Enforcement actions that fail to reflect this sense 
of shared responsibility, and instead focus exclusively on the role of the 
compliance officer, may not be ensuring the appropriate level of 
engagement by all senior managers with the ability to influence a firm’s 
compliance culture. In addition, such enforcement actions risk being 
 
 263. See Raymond James & Assoc., Inc., supra note 4; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Haider, No. 
15-1518 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2016); Aegis Capital Corp., supra note 4; In the Matter of SFX Fin. Advisory 
Mgmt. Enterprises, Inc., supra note 4; In the Matter of Blackrock Advisors, LLC, supra note 4; Brown 
Brothers Consent, supra note 4. 
 264. Of the twenty-six enforcement actions FinCEN brought for BSA violations from in 2014 and 
2015, only seven were against compliance officers. See Enforcement Actions, FINANCIAL CRIMES 
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/news-room/enforcement-actions (last visited Nov. 
21, 2017). Of these, only one involved charges against other firm personnel. Id. From 2003–2015, the 
SEC brought 1,300 enforcement actions against investment advisers/investment companies, only five 
of which were brought against individuals with CCO-only titles that involved charges under Rule 
204(4)-7. Ceresney, supra note 1; Aguilar, supra note 1. Two of these, the SFX and BlackRock cases, 
were brought in 2015 and did not involve charges against other parties. Ceresney, supra note 1. Of 
eighty-two FINRA enforcement actions for AML program failures from 2014 through 2016,  
twenty-three involved charges directed only at compliance officers. Spreadsheet Tracking FINRA 
Enforcement Matters, prepared by Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan (on file with the Author). 
 265. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE 4 (2d ed. 
2017) (“The Three Lines of Defense Line One: operating executives have initial responsibility for 
implementing internal controls within their own areas. Line Two: risk-management and compliance 
operations catch problems that are not weeded out at the front line. Line Three: internal audit checks 
up on everyone, including risk management and compliance, in an attempt to make sure that no 
problems remain.”). 
 266. Id. 
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viewed by the compliance community as unfairly placing the totality of 
responsibility for the effectiveness of a firm’s program on the compliance 
officer’s shoulders.267  
3.   Recent Trends in Law Enforcement and Regulatory Policy 
Finally, the perception among financial sector compliance officers 
that they are being targeted may also be attributed to recent trends in law 
enforcement and regulatory policy. At the same time that they are 
witnessing an uptick in noteworthy enforcement actions against their 
peers at other institutions, compliance officers are also observing an 
increased focus on individuals in cases of corporate misconduct.268 
Deputy Attorney General Yates’ issuance of new DOJ guidance in 
September 2015, which compels federal prosecutors to examine 
individual culpability as a condition of resolving cases against 
corporations, is the most significant illustration of this shift.269 Another 
 
 267. See Glazer, supra note 5 (quoting one compliance officer who had worked for large U.S. and 
foreign banks as saying, “It’s easier for firms to give up their compliance officer, because what are they 
going to do, give up the CEO?”); Kentouris, supra note 170 (quoting a brokerage compliance officer as 
saying, “We’re caught between a rock and a hard place . . . . We can provide the best advice possible 
but if it falls on deaf ears, we’re the ones paying the price.”). 
 268. See Jeremiah Buckley, The Compliance Officer Bill of Rights, AM. BANKER (Feb. 22, 2016), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/the-compliance-officer-bill-of-rights (“Regulators and 
prosecutors are under increasing pressure to bring charges not only against companies, but also 
against individual corporate officers.”); DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5 (noting “a new era of scrutiny 
and personal liability for senior executives and compliance officers.”); Key Trends in BSA/AML 
Compliance: Heightened Regulatory Expectations as Industry Growth Presents New Challenges, 
PAUL HASTINGS (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/ 
details/?id=58f9e369-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded (“[The federal banking agencies] may hold 
individual officers accountable for compliance program deficiencies, regardless of whether the officers 
serve at national banks with significant experience and compliance resources, at small insured 
institutions, or at relatively new MSBs or other nonbank entities.”). 
 269. Memorandum from Sally Quillan Yates, Dep. Att’y Gen., Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Wrongdoing, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 9, 2015) (prescribing six guidelines to strengthen 
DOJ action: “(l) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the 
Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct; (2) criminal 
and civil corporate investigations should focus on individuals from the inception of the investigation; 
(3) criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in routine communication 
with one another; (4) absent extraordinary circumstances or approved departmental policy, the 
Department will not release culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability when resolving a 
matter with a corporation; (5) Department attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation 
without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should memorialize any declinations as to 
individuals in such cases; and (6) civil attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well as the 
company and evaluate whether to bring suit against an individual based on considerations beyond that 
individual's ability to pay.”); see also DOJ’s Newest Policy Pronouncement: The Hunt for Corporate 
Executives, GIBSON DUNN (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Yates-
Memo--DOJ-New-Posture-on-Prosecutions-of-Individuals--Consequences-for-Companies.aspx 
(“The Yates Memorandum has been heralded as a sign of new resolve at DOJ, and follows a series of 
public statements made by DOJ officials indicating that they intend to adopt a more severe posture 
towards ‘flesh-and-blood’ corporate criminals, not just corporate entities.”); The Yates Memo and the 
DOJ’s Focus on Individuals, ALSTON & BIRD (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.alston.com/advisories/DOJ-
GOLUMBIC_17 (MEDRANO) 12/22/17  12:40 AM 
86 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:45 
is the tonal shift among prominent law enforcement and regulatory 
officials emphasizing individual accountability.270 Accompanying this 
enhanced focus on individuals is a greater emphasis on the role of 
compliance more generally, as evidenced by the appointment last year of 
the first-ever Compliance Counsel to the DOJ.271 
 
yates-memo/ (“The new policies are intended to increase scrutiny of high-level executives and 
pressure corporations to turn over evidence against their employees, in both criminal and civil 
proceedings.”); DOJ Issues New Guidance on Pursuing Individual Accountability for Corporate 
Wrongdoing, COVINGTON & BURLING (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/ 
corporate/publications/2015/09/doj_memo_individual_corporate_wrongdoing.pdf (“[O]ne thing is 
clear: DOJ is trying to send a message to the public and to agents and prosecutors across the country 
that the twin goals of punishment and deterrence will not be served unless individuals, as well as 
companies, are held accountable for corporate wrongdoing.”). 
 270. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 226 (“When we look at cases and charging decisions, we look at 
potential liability for individuals in every case.”); Sally Quillan Yates, Dep. Attorney Gen., Remarks at 
New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of 
Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-
general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-school (“[N]othing discourages 
corporate criminal activity like the prospect of people going to prison.”); Benjamin M. Lawsky, 
Superintendent, N.Y State Dep’t of Fin. Serv., Remarks on Financial Institution Regulation in New 
York City at Columbia Law School (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.mondovisione.com/media-and-resources/ 
news/new-york-state-department-of-financial-services-superintendent-benjamin-m-lawsk/ (“In my opinion, 
if in any particular instance [of corporate wrongdoing] we cannot find someone, some person, to hold 
accountable, that just means we have stopped looking. Moreover, even if there are certain 
circumstances where misconduct does not rise to the level of criminal fraud, civil financial regulators 
can also play a role in imposing individual accountability.”); Andrew Ceresney, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n Div. of Enf’t, American Conference Institute’s 32nd FCPA Conference Keynote Address  
(Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ceresney-fcpa-keynote-11-17-15.html (“Holding 
individuals accountable for their wrongdoing is critical to effective deterrence and, therefore, the 
[Enforcement] Division considers individual liability in every case.”). Indeed, this rhetorical focus on 
individual liability in corporate criminal cases appears to be agnostic to party affiliation. See 
Testimony of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen Before the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on “Patterns of Abuse: Assessing Bank 
Secrecy Act Compliance and Enforcement,” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY (Mar. 7, 2013), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1871.aspx (“[T]he BSA allows 
FinCEN to impose civil penalties not only against domestic financial institutions and non-financial 
trades or businesses that willfully violate the BSA, but also against partners, directors, officers and 
employees of such entities who themselves actively participate in misconduct. Although FinCEN has 
employed these tools only occasionally in the past, in the future FinCEN will look for more 
opportunities to impose these types of remedies in appropriate cases.”). 
 271. See Expanding Personal Liability for Chief Compliance Officers: MN Federal Court 
Decision, Proposed NY Regulation Continue the Trend, DLA PIPER (Feb. 24, 2016), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2016/02/expanding-personal-liability/ 
(“The imposition of personal liability on chief compliance officers is part of the regulators’ broader 
interest in compliance failures at the highest levels of financial institutions.”); Ralph E. Sharpe, 
Personal Liability: Issues for Compliance Professionals, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE (Mar.–Apr. 2016) 
https://www.aba.com/Products/bankcompliance/Documents/BCcoverstory.pdf (“Clearly, on an 
increasing basis, regulators are looking for ways to underscore the importance of AML compliance by 
sending a very strong message to compliance professionals that not only may the institution they serve 
be at risk, they may also be found personally liable.”); see also New Compliance Counsel Expert 
Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download. 
“Among her duties as a consulting expert, [the Compliance Counsel] will provide expert guidance to 
Fraud Section prosecutors as they consider the enumerated factors in the United States Attorneys’ 
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While these initiatives have signaled a new era of individual 
scrutiny, a proposed regulation introduced by the New York State 
Department of Financial Services in December 2015 threatened to take 
this notion to a potentially troubling extreme.272 The proposed rule 
required CCOs or their functional equivalents to annually certify as to the 
compliance of their financial institutions’ AML and sanctions screening 
controls with applicable regulations, facing potential criminal penalties 
for false or incorrect certifications.273 
The criminal sanctions were ultimately dropped from the final 
version of the rule.274 However, when viewed in the context of the new 
DOJ guidance, the appointment of Compliance Counsel and other policy 
developments, the inclusion of criminal penalties in the earlier iteration 
may have been sufficient to heighten the anxiety of financial sector 
compliance officers and fuel the impression that they are receiving a 
disproportionate amount of attention.275 
IV.  PROPOSALS FOR MITIGATING THE PERCEPTION OF TARGETING  
AND ITS “CHILLING EFFECT” 
Whatever the cause, the potential “chilling effect” of the recent 
enforcement actions against financial sector compliance officers is deeply 
concerning. If the “demoralizing belief” persists among compliance 
officers that the system is potentially undermining them, and that “even 
exercising their best judgment will not protect them from the risk of a 
career ending enforcement action,” many more will leave or forego the 
profession entirely rather than face the risks.276 
 
Manual concerning the prosecution of business entities, including the existence and effectiveness of 
any compliance program that a company had in place at the time of the conduct giving rise to the 
prospect of criminal charges, and whether the corporation has taken meaningful remedial action, such 
as the implementation of new compliance measures to detect and prevent future wrongdoing.” Id. 
 272. Regulating Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Systems Maintained by Banks, Check 
Cashers and Money Transmitters, 37 N.Y. REG. 9, 11 (proposed Dec. 16, 2015).  
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See DLA PIPER SURVEY, supra note 5, at 3 (“Coupled with the appointment of Hui Chen as the 
Justice Department’s first-ever compliance counsel and accompanied by a steady drumbeat of 
guidance from Andrew Ceresney, Securities and Exchange Commission director of enforcement, the 
[Yates] memo seemed to signal a new era of scrutiny and personal liability for senior executives and 
compliance officers.”); see also Personal Liability or Talent Drain?, ACAMSTODAY (May 9, 2016), 
http://www.acamstoday.org/personal-liability-or-talent-drain/ (“Ultimately, regulators were put 
under severe criticism for not having been able to hold responsible key executives for all failings of the 
financial crisis. The lack of meaningful enforcement actions against senior individuals shifted the 
nature of supervisory responsibilities to personal liability. That said, compliance officers gradually 
became the target of ‘witch hunts,’ in which some ended up being ‘burned alive’ at the stake for all 
noncompliant obligations and wrongdoings.”). 
 276. See Crossley, supra note 129 (suggesting that enforcement actions against compliance officers 
will engender “a demoralizing belief that even exercising their best judgment will not protect them 
from the risk of a career ending enforcement action, with the result that many of the best compliance 
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A. SENIOR MANAGER ACCOUNTABILITY 
To mitigate the perception of compliance officer targeting, a senior 
manager accountability scheme similar to the system recently 
implemented in the United Kingdom. On March 7, 2016, the FCA and 
PRA implemented the so-called “Senior Managers Regime” (“SMR”).277 
The SMR, which was conceived in response to the financial crisis of  
2007-2008 and LIBOR rate-fixing scandals,278 is designed to “embed 
personal accountability into the culture” of the UK financial services 
industry.279 
The SMR focuses on individuals who perform “Senior Management 
Functions” in regulated firms, including not only senior compliance 
functions, but a range of other senior business and controls-side roles as 
well.280 Firms are required to identify personnel performing such 
functions and to allocate to them certain prescribed responsibilities.281 
Firms will also have to seek and obtain regulatory approval for any new 
Senior Manager appointment or any material change in role for a current 
Senior Manager.282 The SMR is supported by conduct rules that apply to 
Senior Managers and other employees, requiring them to act with 
integrity, to display due care, skill, and diligence, to have regard for 
customers and treat them fairly, and to observe proper standards of 
 
officers will choose to leave the profession rather than face the risks.”). 
 277. Senior Managers and Certification Regime, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (Sept. 9, 2016), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/print/firms/senior-managers-certification-regime. The Senior Managers 
Regime replaced the previous “Approved Persons Regime,” (“APR”) which required regulated 
financial services firms to apply for FCA or Prudential Conduct Authority approval before a person 
could be employed to perform a “controlled function.” HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, SENIOR MANAGERS 
AND CERTIFICATION REGIME: EXTENSION TO ALL FSMA AUTHORIZED PERSONS 3 (2015). The APR was 
criticized as being insufficiently focused on senior management. Id. at 4. 
 278. The London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) is supposed to represent the price that a bank 
pays to borrow money from another bank. LIBOR, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libor. 
In the LIBOR scandal, financial institutions were accused of providing information on the interest 
rates used to calculate LIBOR in order to keep LIBOR artificially low. See James McBride, 
Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 12, 2016), https:// 
www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-libor-scandal; LIBOR Scandal, INVESTOPEDIA, http:// 
www.investopedia.com/terms/l/libor-scandal.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2017); Rep. Dennis Kucinich, 
The LIBOR Scandal Explained, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/rep-dennis-kucinich/the-libor-scandal-explain_b_1666353.html; All Things Considered, 
What Does London’s LIBOR Mean to the U.S.?, NPR (July 7, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/ 
07/07/156428433/what-does-londons-libor-mean-to-the-u-s. 
 279. FCA Publishes Final Rules to Make Those in the Banking Sector More Accountable, Financial 
Conduct Authority (July 7, 2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/fca-publishes-final-
rules-make-those-banking-sector-more-accountable (quoting Martin Wheatley, Chief Exec., Fin. 
Conduct Auth.). 
 280. HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, supra note 277. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 7. Individuals not performing Senior Management Functions but whose roles are 
deemed capable of causing harm to the firm or its clients will be subject to a “Certification Regime” 
requiring firms to assess, and certify to, the fitness and propriety of these persons. Id. 
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market conduct.283 In addition, Senior Managers in particular are 
compelled to take reasonable steps to ensure that their businesses 
comply with the relevant requirements, to delegate appropriately, and to 
supervise the performance of the delegation.284 
Notably, the SMR incorporates a “[s]tatutory duty of responsibility 
to be applied consistently to all Senior Managers across the financial 
services industry.”285 Pursuant to this duty, regulators may take 
enforcement action against individual employees that have “contravened 
the statements of principle that apply directly to them,” or if the manager 
is “knowingly concerned in a breach of regulatory requirements by the 
firm.”286 An additional standard applies to Senior Managers, permitting 
individual action if: (1) the firm has contravened regulatory requirements 
and the breach occurred in the part of the business for which the Senior 
Manager is responsible; and (2) the regulator can demonstrate that the 
manager “failed to take steps that is reasonable for a person in that 
position to take” to prevent the breach.287 
Senior FCA officials have stressed that the “[SMR] is not a means for 
making senior managers strictly or even vicariously liable for 
contraventions by firms.”288 Rather, the SMR is designed to focus “on the 
people who can make a difference, the senior management, and it is top 
down rather than bottom up . . . .”289 By definition, therefore, the SMR 
focuses on a range of key personnel performing key supervisory 
functions, most certainly including the business as well as additional 
control-side functions. 
The adoption in the U.S. of a senior manager accountability regime 
similar to the SMR would be a significant step in the effort to combat the 
perception of compliance officer targeting. By establishing clear 
expectations and standards for senior managers across multiple business 
and control functions, the ability to a shape a firm’s compliance culture 
and control environment will be enhanced. Moreover, the explicit 
sharing of personal responsibility across a wider spectrum of senior 
personnel performing key supervisory functions would provide greater 
 
 283. Mark Seward, Dir. of Enf’t & Mkt. Oversight, Fin. Conduct Auth., Tackling the Hard 
Questions (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk./print/news/speeches/tackling-hard-questions; 
see also HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, supra note 277. 
 284. See HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, supra note 277. 
 285. Id. at 11. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Seward, supra note 283; see also Martin Wheatley, Chief Exec. Officer, Fin. Conduct Auth., 
Accountability, from Debate to Reality (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/news/ 
speeches/accountability-debate-reality#header (“We should remember¾[SMR] is about reasonable 
steps. I understand it worries firms that the FCA cannot say ‘if you do X, Y and Z you’ll be fine’; but in 
the same breath, it is equally true that Senior Managers are not automatically going to be fined.”). 
 289. See Seward, supra 283.  
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assurance to compliance officers that their conduct will be assessed not 
in isolation, but within the context of a broader managerial effort.290 
B. JOINT INDUSTRY-REGULATORY ADVISORY GROUP  
A second proposal for mitigating the perception of compliance 
officer targeting is to establish a joint industry-regulatory advisory group 
to address the issue. At a conference of securities industry legal and 
compliance professionals in March 2016, John F.W. Rogers, in his 
capacity as Chair of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (“SIFMA”), proposed the creation of a permanent working 
group “to act as a unified voice for collective viewpoints and concerns  
. . . .”291 This group, which would be made up of key representatives from 
both the regulatory community and the financial sector, would meet 
regularly to discuss “the efficacy and impact of existing and prospective 
regulatory, examination and enforcement efforts.”292 
The approach is not novel. The Treasury Department’s Bank Secrecy 
Act Advisory Group has served as an effective advisory body to regulators 
on AML compliance issues for more than thirty years, providing valuable 
feedback on the commercial impact of their initiatives, and the industry 
with an opportunity to influence the manner in which they are 
regulated.293 
On the issue of compliance officer liability, this working group could 
be a “vehicle . . . through which a more organized and focused industry 
engagement effort can share its views, opine on matters of 
fairness . . . and make recommendations.”294 For example, the group 
could facilitate an open and continuous discussion about the types of 
behavior undertaken by compliance officers that would meet the 
 
 290. See Personal Liability or Talent Drain?, supra note 275 (“Perhaps regulators should push the 
board of directors and senior management to emphasize a stronger culture of compliance across all 
three lines of defense . . . . This would foster a better collaboration and prevent compliance 
professionals . . . from asking the question of whether it is worth their personal reputation to remain 
with the organization.”). 
 291. John. F.W. Rogers, Chairman, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Assoc., Remarks as Prepared for 
SIFMA C&L Society Annual Seminar 2016 (Mar. 15, 2016). 
 292. Id. SIFMA could be a viable sponsor for such a forum. So too could an American Law  
Institute-sponsored project on the Principles of the Law, Compliance, Enforcement, and Risk 
Management for Corporations, Nonprofits, and Other Organizations. See New Principles Project on 
Corporate Compliance, AM. L. INST. (May 20, 2015), http://2015annualmeeting.org/new-principles-
project-on-corporate-compliance. 
 293. Id. The Bank Secrecy Act Advisory Group (“BSAAG”) was established in 1992 and has served 
as a forum for industry, regulators and law enforcement to communicate about how BSA reporting 
and regulatory requirements can be improved. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL 
YEAR 2004 17 (2004), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/annual_report_ 
fy2004.pdf. Chaired by the Director of FinCEN, the BSAAG is comprised of representatives of the 
financial sectors that are subject to BSA regulation, as well as the law enforcement and regulatory 
authorities responsible for BSA regulation and enforcement. Id. 
 294. Rogers, supra note 291. 
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definition of crossing the line.295 It could also promote consensus among 
regulators as to the definition of wholesale or broad-based failures giving 
rise to individual liability.296 The group could thus provide increased 
transparency into the types of conduct deemed actionable by regulators, 
and greater uniformity in charging practices. 
The advisory group could also offer valuable insight to law 
enforcement and regulators regarding the broader implications of 
charging decisions.297 The group could serve as the forum for evaluating 
the range of appropriate sanctions that should apply to compliance 
officer conduct.298 The group could even act as an advisory body in 
specific cases where the conduct of individual compliance officers is at 
issue.299 The advisory group’s imprimatur could therefore have a 
leavening effect on negative sentiment from the compliance community 
by conveying the impression that compliance officers’ interests are 
effectively represented, and that the potential for unfair or inappropriate 
targeting will be accorded the requisite level of attention.300 
A significant mandate of the advisory group would be to regularly 
publish guidance.301 This guidance would reflect the experiences and 
perspectives of each agency that is conducting examinations and 
enforcement investigations, as well as each industry member that is on 
the receiving end of them.302 The result would be a regulatory community 
that is applying more consistent standards, and a community of the 
regulated that is more cognizant of prevailing expectations.303 
In short, by providing compliance officers with a greater sense of 
control over their collective destiny, the group could temper the factors, 
such as the aggregate impact of multiple enforcement actions, and the 
enhanced law enforcement and regulatory focus on individuals that are 
contributing to the continued perception of targeting.304 
 
 295. See supra notes 7-9, 198, 202, 211–223, 225, 264, 288 and accompanying text. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Indeed, the working group could have been provided an opportunity to explore the 
unintended consequences of the DFS’ proposal to criminalize incorrect AML officer certifications, 
before the proposed rule was disseminated to the public. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 299. Rogers, supra note 291. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. 
 304. See supra notes 260-275 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
The work you perform as compliance professionals is critically 
important to investors and the integrity of the markets. You are on the 
front lines working to create, implement, and enforce a strong and 
comprehensive set of policies, procedures, and systems to govern and 
supervise firm employees. Your work helps ensure that investors are 
armed with the information they need to make fully-informed 
decisions. Importantly, you help prevent problems from occurring in 
the first place and, if and when problems do arise, you use those 
experiences to inform your future work to promote early detection and 
remediation. . . . We want to support you in your efforts and work 
together as a team.305 
This statement by SEC Chair White, made at a convocation of 
brokerage industry compliance professionals in 2015, reflects a theme 
that has been consistently reinforced by senior law enforcement and 
regulatory officials. Officials have repeatedly touted their partnership 
with financial sector compliance officers, their appreciation for the vital 
role they play, and their recognition of how complex and challenging the 
task can be.306 
Notwithstanding these genuine expressions of support, the recent 
upswing in noteworthy enforcement actions against individual 
compliance officers has engendered anxiety, and a perception that they 
are being singled out.307 Regulators’ efforts to alleviate such concerns, 
moreover, have thus far proven insufficient.308 This is so despite repeated 
assurances that personal charges against compliance officers for 
wholesale or broad-based program failures rarely occur, and when they 
do, are carefully considered and always supported by compelling 
evidence.309 The perception of targeting has persisted, and has been 
accompanied by increased attrition within the ranks of senior 
compliance officers in the industry, and a growing number of would-be 
compliance officers who are reconsidering this career path.310 
The enduring nature of the perception can be attributed to any or all 
of several factors, including the aggregate impact of recent enforcement 
actions, the isolation factor, and the increased focus by law enforcement 
and regulators on individual accountability.311 Regardless of the cause, 
the resulting “chilling effect” on financial sector compliance officers 
should raise an alarm. The level of ensuing “brain drain” could diminish 
 
 305. White, supra note 198. 
 306. See supra notes 198, 211-225, 287 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra notes 169-170, 196-197, 210, 252, 267-271, 275-276, 279 and accompanying text. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See supra notes 7–9, 198, 202, 211-223, 225, 264, 288 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 169-170, 196-197, 252, 267, 275-276 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 260-275 and accompanying text. 
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significantly the efficacy of financial sector compliance programs, and the 
integrity of the industry more generally.312 What lawmakers and 
regulators must decide, then, is whether the benefits of their current 
approach to holding compliance officers accountable for their firms’ 
program failures, whether in terms of increased compliance officer 
vigilance or something else, outweigh the costs of this continued exodus. 
As previously noted, in explaining his dissent in the BlackRock and 
SFX cases, SEC Commissioner Gallagher cautioned, “we should strive to 
avoid the perverse incentives that will naturally flow from targeting 
compliance personnel who are willing to run into the fires that so often 
occur at regulated entities.”313 We believe the proposals discussed above 
in Part V reflect Commissioner Gallagher’s message. Actions must be 
taken to restore confidence among financial sector compliance officers 
that their already difficult jobs have not become untenable. More than 
having an understanding of their role within the larger framework, these 
professionals need to fully internalize that they are part of an unbiased 
system in which accountability is distributed among all relevant senior 
business and control-side personnel. They need to feel as if their interests 
are being effectively considered and represented. The perception of 
compliance officer targeting must be reversed before the “big chill” sets 
in and the industry finds that this critical function has been robbed of its 
best and brightest. 
  
 
 312. See Aguilar, supra note 1 (“[I] am concerned that the recent public dialogue may have 
unnecessarily created an environment of unwarranted fear in the CCO community. Such an 
environment is unhelpful, sends the wrong message, and can discourage honest and competent CCOs 
from doing their work.”); Rogers, supra note 291 (“The ‘brain drain’ that could result from the 
misdirected targeting of compliance officers will eventually detract from¾not enhance¾the efficacy 
of financial institutions’ compliance programs.”); Crossley, supra note 129 (“[W]e submit that a 
fundamental policy question is whether enforcement actions against compliance officers will motivate 
them to greater vigilance or risk a demoralizing belief that even exercising their best judgment will not 
protect them from the risk of a career ending enforcement action, with the result that many of the best 
compliance officers will choose to leave the profession rather than face the risks.”). 
 313. Gallagher, supra note 184. 
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